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This dissertation studies the role that the information available to the par-
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In Chapter 1 I build and estimate a model of repeated asymmetric first price
auction in which one of the bidders has a persistent private type, all bidders are
backward looking, and all bids are made public after the auction. In particular,
I show that the standard model without a binding reserve price misestimates ex-
pected procurement costs by 2-14% compared to my model, and withholding past
bid information from auction participants can reduce expected procurement costs
by up to 11%. These results are relevant for the estimation of both US highway
procurement auctions since all of the states’ Departments of Transportation publish
full auction results online.
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equilibrium would not exist in this game, and provide an example of a partially
pooling equilibrium in which the bidder with persistent type forgoes profits in the
earlier period to withhold the information from her competitors in future periods.
Chapter 3 studies the effect that the changes in public procurement rules in
Russia had on participation and bidding in regional gasoline procurement auctions.
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Chapter 1: Autocorrelated Costs and Information in Repeated First
Price Procurement Auctions
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter I study the effect of transparency in repeated procurement auc-
tions on bidder behavior and optimal auction outcomes. The practice of publishing
the results of previous public procurement auctions provides additional information
on the rival bidders costs in markets where costs are correlated over time. I extend
the standard framework for the estimation of firm costs in an asymmetric first price
auction to account for the presence of past bid information. Using data on two types
of highway procurement auctions in Oklahoma I show that firms account for avail-
able information on past bids when the competitor bids are correlated over time.
In such markets all firms bid more aggressively when a low bid from the leading
firm was observed in the past, and less aggressively when the high bid was observed.
Increasing competition diminishes, but does not cancel out these effects. In my
counterfactual analysis I show that the standard model without a binding reserve
price misestimates expected procurement costs by 2-14%, and withholding past bid
information from auction participants can reduce expected procurement costs by
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up to 11%, and the leading firm markup by up to 3%. Setting an optimal reserve
price reduces expected procurement costs by 9% in the standard model, and by up
to additional 7% if the past bids are observed by the firms. Withholding past bid
information in an auction with optimal reserve price does not change the expected
cost of procurement significantly, but reduces the markup of the leading firm by 1%.
Transparency is a common requirement for public procurement auctions. In
practice this means that most of the government bodies conducting auctions publish
extensive information both before and after the auction. For example, Departments
of Transportation of all fifty US states publish auction results within several days
after the winner is determined. Full bid tabulations including the identities and bids
of all participating firms are published in most states, with a few remaining states
publishing only the identities and the bids of the winner and the runner-up in each
auction. At the same time auctions conducted by the private parties are usually
not so transparent. Most of the private company procurement policies protect the
identity of contractors, and Ebay has introduced “private auctions” in which bidders
can only see their own bid and losing or winning status both during and after the
auction. In both of these cases the identities of the bidders and their bids are known
either only to the auctioneer, or to the auctioneer and the direct auction participants.
The transparency of public procurement auctions is usually motivated by preventing
corruption and general government accountability, while the non-transparency of
the private auctions is motivated by personal and corporate privacy, and preventing
possible collusion by bidders. However, in the repeated auction setting the choice
between releasing and concealing the information about past auction may have
2
additional consequences. In this chapter I argue that transparency can have a
direct effect on the outcomes of a set of repeated private value auctions through
the channels not related to corruption and collusion concerns since it can provide
valuable information to auction participants and promote competition from weaker
bidders.
Consider a typical highway procurement auction market. The firms in this
market compete repeatedly to fulfill contracts for similar projects. In this setting,
the firm’s bidding history might be informative to its competitors if firm’s costs
of completing these projects are serially correlated. The serial correlation can be
caused by overlapping timeline of completing the projects, or by the costs structure
including some of the slower changing costs, for example labor costs which are only
renegotiated once a year, long term supplier costs, etc. Previous work has tried to
control for the serial correlation in firm costs using observable firm backlog. But
backlog is likely to be an insufficient representation of the serial correlation of firm’s
costs since it reflects only some of the reasons for persistent costs, provides additional
information only for the winner of the last auction, and is in general less informative
than the past bids submitted by the firm.
In this chapter I estimate the effect of the past bid information on the behavior
of firms in the current auction. I develop a model of a first price procurement auc-
tion with private values in which all participating firms can observe an informative
signal about the past period costs of one of the firms. Auction participants update
their beliefs of the rival’s costs upon observing the signal and adjust their bidding
strategies accordingly. I use the parametric structural model introduced by Athey,
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Levin, and Seira (2011) for the first price auctions with unobserved heterogeneity,
and introduce past bid information as an additional observable auction character-
istic to estimate the underlying firm characteristics in two highway procurement
markets in the state of Oklahoma. I compare the market for bridge construction
and repair contracts, with fulfillment times ranging from 3 to 12 months and the
bids of the leading firms are strongly correlated over time, and the market for pave-
ment contracts, in which a typical project takes 1 to 2 months to complete and the
bids of the leading firms are not significantly correlated over time.
I find that releasing the information about past bids significantly changes the
behavior of all firms participating in the bridge auctions, and almost does not distort
the behavior of the firms participating in the pavement auctions. The results of the
model estimation show that when the past bid information factors into the firm
bidding behavior, the firms submit lower bids for any draw of their own costs if they
have observed a signal about low competitor costs, and higher bids for the own costs
below some threshold value if they have observed a signal about high competitor
costs.
To quantify the consequences of the auction transparency for the auctioneer,
I compute several counterfactuals. The first scenario corresponds to the standard
asymmetric first price auction model in which neither the auctioneer nor the par-
ticipating firms account for the past bid information. The other scenarios simulate
the outcome for the case when either only the bidders, only the auctioneer, or both
the bidders and the auctioneer have access to and account for the available past bid
information. I show that ignoring the informational effect significantly changes both
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the optimal reserve price and the expectations of the auctioneer with regards to the
price of the contract compared to the standard model. However, if the auctioneer
can set an optimal reserve price, additional benefits of withholding this information
from the bidders are small, which argues in favor of the existing practice of full
transparency.
To my knowledge, the effect of the past bid information on the current auction
has not been studied empirically. However, there are several categories of papers that
are methodologically and theoretically related to this question. In particular, this
chapter is related to the limited empirical literature on dynamic auctions originating
from Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2007). In these papers a discrete event, such as
winning an auction or participating in an auction, changes an observed dynamic
firm-level state variable, providing the link between time periods. The first group of
these papers focuses on the effect of firm backlog and capacity constraints in repeated
auction markets. The firms can participate in auctions each period, but, similarly to
the case studied in this chapter, it takes them longer than one period to fulfill most
of the contracts. This means that a firm already burdened by sufficient workload
might chose not to participate in the auction or bid less aggressively in the current
period. In the original paper by Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2007) regular bidders
take into account the effect of increased backlog in case of winning the current
auction when submitting a bid in the current auction. They show that an increase
in capacity utilization significantly increases the costs of regular bidders. Balat
(2013) extends this model to add unobserved auction heterogeneity and endogenous
firm participation. Saini (2012) and Jeziorski and Krasnokutskaya (2016) extend the
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model to include optimal scheduling and subcontracting respectively. Second group
of papers, for example Tiererova (2013) and Groeger (2014), use firm participation
and winning dynamics in a learning-by-doing model, showing that firms who have
experience in preparing bids have lower participation costs and firms who have
experience in performing the contracts have lower anticipated costs and would bid
more aggressively.
Another related subject of empirical auctions literature is sequential auctions
with complementarities or substitutabilities across units. Kong (2016) studies se-
quential auctions for oil and gas tracts let in adjacent pairs, and finds that both
synergy and value affiliation are present in these auctions, with affiliation being re-
sponsible for the allocation patterns. Donna and Esṕın-Sánchez (2018) study water
auctions in which the units sold can be complements or substitutes depending on
the auction timing. They find that firms show different pricing and participation
patterns depending on the relationship between objects sold in sequential auctions:
when units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for
the first unit and deters entry by competitors; when units are substitutes, different
bidders win the units with positive probability. De Silva et al. (2005) show in a
reduced form study of Oklahoma DoT auctions that past winners are both more
likely to participate in and win future auctions in the same geographical location,
and attribute this fact to production synergy.
Finally, Somaini (2011) shows that the model with affiliated private firm costs
describes the Michigan DoT procurement auctions better than a model with stan-
dard private costs. In his model the firms receive correlated private signals about
6
their own costs prior to the auction.
Some theoretical and experimental literature addresses the effect of informa-
tion disclosure in auctions with persistent bidder valuations or costs more directly.
However only partial and special case solutions of the problem exist, and it is not
clear if an equilibrium in a fully dynamic model with persistent firm characteristics
would always exist. Mart́ınez-Pardina (2006) looks at the auctions in which one of
the firm’s valuations is common knowledge prior to the auction. She finds the equi-
librium of this game, including the mixed equilibrium strategy of the player with
publicly known valuation, and shows that revealing one of the bidders’ valuations
serves as a random reserve price in the auction. She shows that for a particular set
of symmetric distributions it is beneficial for the auctioneer to commit to revealing
one of the bidder’s valuations ex ante, though this might hurt the auctioneer ex
post. Landsberger et al. (2001) study first price auctions in which the ranking of
the valuations is common knowledge. They show that bidders bid more aggressively
when this information is provided, and hence the auctioneer is better off provid-
ing this information. Fang and Morris (2006) consider a first price auction with
two bidders and discrete valuations, in which competitors can receive costly signals
about each others valuations. In this very limited setting they also show that the
auctioneer is better off providing very precise signals about the bidder valuations to
all players. Tu (2006) shows that announcing the winning bid is the most benefi-
cial disclosure policy for an auctioneer in a first price auction with two bidders and
uniformly distributed valuations. He also provides an example of a disclosure pol-
icy that would lead to non-existence of non-decreasing equilibrium. Thomas (2010)
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shows in a discrete type two bidder model that the auctioneer is better off either
revealing no information at all, or all information available about the past auction.
Bergemann and Hörner (2018) look at an infinitely repeated first price auction with
perfectly persistent values and show that minimal information disclosure is good for
the auctioneer. However they note that if the values are not perfectly persistent this
result might cease to hold. Finally experimental papers by Andreoni et al. (2007),
Cason et al. (2011), and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002), show that players learn,
play pooling equilibria in the discrete values case, and in general take into account
the past bid information released by the auctioneer.
This chapter provides an additional argument in support of the importance of
information disclosure regimes, and a simple approach for estimating the effects of
information disclosure in repeated procurement auction setting.
1.2 Data and institutional environment
I use the data on procurement auctions held by Oklahoma Department of
Transportation (DoT) between April 2000 and August 2003. In this period of time
the Oklahoma DoT held between 15 and 70 auctions per month with total budget
of 8.5 to 65.5 million dollars. The timeline of a typical auction starts about a
year before the letting date when the preliminary plan of works is published. More
detailed auction documentation describing the projects is published one month in
advance. Firms can purchase full project documentation, also known as a “plan”,
for a small fee (∼ $20), and the list of planholders is publicly available and regularly
8
updated until the contract letting date. The firms that want to participate in the
auction must be prequalified1 and obtain the project documentation. After that
a firm can submit a sealed bid at any day between the last month’s letting date
and current month’s letting date. All of the Oklahoma DoT auctions are first
price low bid auctions, i.e. all submitted bids for a given auction are opened at
the same time, the firm with the lowest submitted bid wins and pays her own
bid. All auctions scheduled for the month are closed at the same letting date.
After all bids are opened and auction winners determined, the auction results and
detailed bid tabulations including names of all participating firms are published on
the Oklahoma DoT website. Since April 2000 Oklahoma DoT also publishes the
engineer’s estimate for the project with the detailed break-down of the estimate in
the planning documentation2 ahead of time. De Silva et al. (2008) show that the
publication of the engineer’s estimate has significantly changed the bidding behavior
of both the incumbents and the entrants suggesting that firms in the Oklahoma DoT
procurement market pay attention to the publicly released information. To avoid
conflating the effect of information available in the engineer’s estimate and the
information available in the rival bids, I would only use the data after April 2000.
There are six categories of works a firm may prequalify for in the state of
Oklahoma. I concentrate on the paving (category C) and bridge (category D) works
since they are the two most prevalent types of works both by the number of firms
participating and the number of auctions held. Bridge and pavement works can
1This requires filling in a simple application form, and undergoing a financial audit.
2Figures 1.14 and 1.15 in Appendix 1.7.6 provide and example of publicly available information
before and after the auction letting date.
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be viewed as separate markets. The firms performing bridge works and pavement
projects in general do not overlap and specialize only in one type of works. Though
about a third of the firms have participated in the auctions of both types during
the observed time period, only 19 out of 136 have won auctions in both markets,
and only one of them won more than 10 auctions in each of the markets. There are
several distinctions between pavement and bridge works markets that are related to
the subject of this chapter, namely to the way the firms’ costs are correlated over
time, and how much additional information about the rivals’ costs can be inferred
from her past bids. First of the prominent differences between the bridge works
and pavement contracts auctioned is the average duration of estimated work. A
typical bridge repair project (see Figure 1.14 in Appendix 1.7.6) takes 3-12 months
and is geographically concentrated while a typical pavement project (see Figure
1.15 in Appendix 1.7.6) takes 1-2 months to complete and sometimes covers long
distances. This distinction can affect the importance of the past bids information
for the current bidding. Both types of auctions are conducted once a month, and
it is more likely that the bids submitted for the bridge works auctions would be
informative about the next month’s costs since most of the time the bids on a bridge
project would include the anticipated costs of operation in the next month. Second,
the pavement works are more consistent and depend on certain inputs, which makes
contract costs largely depend on the costs of the materials which are known to all
market participants and in the state of Oklahoma are updated every month with the
baseline price publicly available in the “Asphalt Binder Price Index”. At the same
time bridge works have more variety and often include, among other things, the cost
10
of highly skilled labor which can vary between firms and is less public, while at the
same time being consistent over time. Finally, the work on pavement contracts is
more consistent with the standard measure of backlog used in the literature. It is
reasonable to assume that a firm performing a pavement contract paves some fixed
proportion of contracted surface each month. At the same time the tasks involved
in bridge works are less consistent and need to be performed in a particular order,
making the strain on the firm capacity uneven over the duration of the contract,
and the backlog a less informative measure of the possible shifts in firm costs. All of
these factors make it more likely that the firms in the bridge works market would pay
closer attention to the past bids of their competitors than the firms in the pavement
market.
For tractability, I would aggregate all of the past bids information into one ob-
servable signal. To do that first I select one “regular” firm in each market, and sum-
marize all bids submitted by the regular firm in one month into a one-dimensional
signal. In both markets the regular firm is the firm that participates in the largest
number of auctions: 203 out of 373, or more than 54%, in the bridge works market,
and 117 out of 397, or around 30%, in the pavement auctions.3
Second, as regular bidders participate in multiple auctions per month, I would
further aggregate the past month bid information into a one-dimensional signal I
would call an average bid residual.4 The bid residual is constructed as a predicted
3In both markets there are close “second contenders” with 188 and 113 appearances respectively,
with no further close contenders. Though both of the two top firms are most likely providing an
important information with their bids, to abstract from the strategic interaction between them, I
would consider the “second contenders” to be fringe bidders.
4I also use the average bid submitted in the past month for robustness checks. Though the
average bid is a more straightforward choice for a signal, it dos not capture possible auction
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residual from an OLS regression of the submitted bid on the observable characteris-
tics of the past auction. The main benefit of using the average bid residual instead
of the average bid, is that the residual makes the signals from different auctions
comparable regardless of the project size, location, number of bidders etc. The
details of the bid residual constructions can be found in Appendix 1.7.2.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the summary statistics for the bridge and pavement
auctions in the sample. There are 373 bridge auctions with 1556 bids from 81
firms in the sample, and 397 pavement auctions with 1441 bids from 97 firms.
Details of sample constructions can be found in Appendix 1.7.1. There are several
notable differences between the two markets. First, the pavement contract are
almost five times larger in size on average. Second, even though in both markets
the regular bidder skips auction participation only in 5 time periods, the pavement
regular bidder participates in less auctions per month on average. This can make the
information contained in her past month bid less reliable and less useful to the fringe
bidders. The regular bidder in the pavement market submits 8.5% of all observed
bids, and the past bid information is available for 97% of the auctions the regular
bidder is participating in. The regular bidder in the bridge market submits about
10% of all observed bids. In 93% of the auctions with regular bidder participation
the past bid information is available for the regular bidder.
As a first step to establish the relationship between the past bid signal and
heterogeneity not observed by the researcher, but observed by all participants in the market. It is
also harder to interpret: while a negative bid residual signals about lower than average costs, and a
positive bid residual signals about higher than average costs, we would need additional information
about bid averages to interpret the value of the average bid signal.
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Table 1.1: Auction summary statistics: Bridge auctions
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Number of auctions per month 41 9.1 4.84 3 20
Number of regular bidder participations
per month
41 4.59 3.84 0 16
Engineer’s estimate ($000) 373 546.77 1278.89 7.9 18664.31
Number of plan holders. 373 6.83 2.65 2 19
Regular bidder participation 373 .69 .46 0 1
Number of fringe bidders 373 3.48 1.59 1 12
Lagged average bid (% of Eng. est.) 340 1.01 .13 .8 1.47
Lagged bid residual 340 -.02 .1 -.35 .32
Winning bid (% of Eng. est.) 373 .92 .14 .7 1.49
Regular bidder bid (% of Eng. est.) 188 .99 .17 .73 1.85
Bid (% of Eng. est.) 1556 1.05 .24 .7 2.44
Table 1.2: Auction summary statistics: Pavement auctions
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Number of auctions per month 41 9.68 7.18 2 37
Number of regular bidder participations
per month
41 2.76 2.4 0 11
Engineer’s estimate ($000) 397 2521.61 4407.27 24.25 32487.49
Number of plan holders. 397 6.89 4.57 2 25
Regular bidder participation 397 .39 .49 0 1
Number of fringe bidders 397 3.24 1.76 1 11
Lagged average bid (% of Eng. est.) 383 .99 .14 .69 1.32
Lagged bid residual 383 0 .17 -.44 .32
Winning bid (% of Eng. est.) 397 .94 .13 .71 1.48
Regular bidder bid (% of Eng. est.) 113 1.02 .15 .78 1.57
Bid (% of Eng. est.) 1441 1.02 .17 .32 1.95
current firm bids, I run a number of OLS regressions of the form:
Bti = α + βXt + γSt−1 + δYit, (1.1)
where Bti is the bid firm i submits at time t, Xt are auction characteristics such
as the number of bidders, project size, project location etc., Yit are firm-specific
characteristics at time t such as backlog and distance to the project, and St−1 is the
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past bid signal with γ being the coefficient of interest.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 present the results of these regressions using past month’s
average bid residual of the regular bidder as an observable signal. All specifications
include project size and location fixed effects, second specification in both tables
includes firm fixed effects 5. The results suggest that both the bids of the regular
bidder and the bids of the fringe bidders positively and significantly depend on the
value of the signal in the bridge market. At the same time there is no relation
between the value of the signal and current bids of either type of bidders in the
pavement market. The bids of the pavement regular bidder are significantly related
to the bidder backlog, while there is no significant dependence between bids and
backlog of the bridge regular bidder. In addition the participation of the regular
bidder significantly reduces the bids submitted by fringe bidders in both markets,
which might signify that the fringe bidders are aware of the regular bidder status in
both markets.
The correlation between lagged bid residual of the regular bidder and current
bids of all market participants might be a result of a general time trend of the costs
of all firms on the market. To control for this I construct an additional observed
signal, a lagged market bid residual, which aggregates the bids of all fringe bidders
observed in the past month. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 present the results of the regressions
controlling for this additional signal. As with previous results, the firms on the
bridge market pay attention to the signal from the regular bidder, and only the
5Tables 1.15 and 1.16 in Appendix 1.7.3 contain results of the similar regressions for average
bid of the regular bidder in past month as an observable signal. Since the results of these two sets
of regressions are qualitatively the same, and it is easier to interpret and model the average bid
residual, I would use it as the signal for the rest of the chapter.
14
Table 1.3: Bridge projects with bid residual signal
Full sample Full sample Full sample ID FE Regular bidder Fringe bidders
(1) (2)† (3) (4)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0055∗ −0.0074∗∗ −0.0064∗ −0.0168∗∗ −0.0066∗
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0072) (0.0036)
Distance 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Backlog 0.0017 −0.0136 0.0411∗ 0.0521 −0.0203
(0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0246) (0.0532) (0.0238)
Lagged bid residual 0.2020∗∗∗ 0.1580∗∗∗ 0.2488∗∗ 0.1971∗∗∗
(0.0559) (0.0546) (0.1154) (0.0618)
Regular participa-
tion dummy
−0.0357∗∗ −0.0356∗∗ −0.0082 −0.0353∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0159) (0.0154)
N 1556 1428 1410 181 1246
adj. R2 0.1220 0.1373 0.2540 0.1826 0.1268
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models include contract size and location fixed effects; † includes firm fixed effects.
Table 1.4: Pavement projects with bid residual signal
Full sample Full sample Full sample ID FE Regular bidder Fringe bidders
(1) (2)† (3) (4)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0107∗∗∗ −0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0107∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0119∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0125) (0.0025)
Distance 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Backlog −0.0260∗ −0.0230 0.0204 −0.1713∗∗ −0.0174
(0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0184) (0.0687) (0.0159)
Lagged bid residual 0.0085 0.0126 0.0668 −0.0004
(0.0257) (0.0253) (0.0821) (0.0270)
Regular participa-
tion dummy
−0.0409∗∗∗ −0.0388∗∗∗ −0.0256∗∗ −0.0398∗∗∗
(0.0093) (0.0103) (0.0121) (0.0104)
N 1441 1378 1356 110 1268
adj. R2 0.1475 0.1457 0.2183 0.2258 0.1441
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models include contract size and location fixed effects; † includes firm fixed effects.
regular bidder pays attention to the rest of the market. On the other hand, the
firms on the pavement market pay no attention to the regular bidder signal, but
make the current bids significantly correlated with the observed market average
residual from past month, with the regular bidder basing a larger proportion of her
bid on this signal.
The reduced form evidence suggests that the behavior of the regular bidder
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Table 1.5: Bridge projects with market level bid residual signal
Full sample Full sample ID FE Regular bidder Fringe bidders
(1) (2)† (3) (4)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0060∗ −0.0061∗ −0.0235∗∗∗ −0.0052
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0078) (0.0038)
Distance 0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0004 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000)
Backlog −0.0088 0.0419∗ 0.0779 −0.0171
(0.0220) (0.0247) (0.0543) (0.0240)
Lagged bid residual 0.2069∗∗∗ 0.1583∗∗∗ 0.2790∗∗ 0.1983∗∗∗
(0.0578) (0.0560) (0.1151) (0.0641)
Lagged market bid residual 0.0292 0.1068 0.4342∗∗ −0.0021
(0.0994) (0.0949) (0.2067) (0.1095)
Regular participation dummy −0.0365∗∗ −0.0064 −0.0307∗
(0.0159) (0.0170) (0.0168)
N 1428 1410 181 1246
adj. R2 0.1360 0.2558 0.1871 0.1275
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models include contract size and location fixed effects; † includes firm fixed effects.
Table 1.6: Pavement projects with market level bid residual signal
Full sample Full sample ID FE Regular bidder Fringe bidders
(1) (2)† (3) (4)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0107∗∗∗ −0.0107∗∗∗ −0.0063 −0.0112∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0126) (0.0026)
Distance 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0004 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Backlog −0.0171 0.0217 −0.1923∗∗∗ −0.0102
(0.0154) (0.0184) (0.0665) (0.0160)
Lagged bid residual −0.0587∗ −0.0474 −0.0935 −0.0567
(0.0356) (0.0355) (0.1095) (0.0375)
Lagged market bid residual 0.1972∗∗∗ 0.1828∗∗ 0.5201∗∗ 0.1687∗∗
(0.0711) (0.0709) (0.2155) (0.0749)
Regular participation dummy −0.0308∗∗ −0.0291∗∗ −0.0340∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0133) (0.0126)
N 1378 1356 110 1268
adj. R2 0.1551 0.2206 0.2948 0.1523
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models include contract size and location fixed effects; † includes firm fixed effects.
in the bridge works market shows significant autocorrelation, and the fringe bidders
take this into account. At the same time, there is no significant autocorrelation
in the pavement regular bidder behavior. In my further analysis I would use this
difference between the two markets to contrast the effects of information disclosure
on the auction outcomes.
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1.3 Model
In this section I describe the model of an asymmetric first price procurement
auction with one regular and n fringe bidders in which a public informative signal
about the costs of the regular bidder is released to all bidders prior to the auction. I
show that after the signal is observed by all auction participants the model becomes
equivalent to a standard asymmetric first price auction, and its identification follows
the results of Guerre et al. (2000), and Flambard and Perrigne (2006).
1.3.1 Setup
There are two types of risk neutral bidders participating in a first price sealed
bid procurement auction. The signal s ∼ S(0, σ2s) is released publicly before the
auction. This signal is informative of the regular bidder’s costs of completing the
contract in the sense that after receiving the signal all auction participants know
that the regular bidder would draw her costs from a conditional distribution F (·|s),
and F (·|s′) FOSD F (·|s) for any s′ ≥ s6. There are n fringe bidders independently
drawing costs from a distribution Z(·) which does not depend on the signal.
The regular bidder submits a bid b, and each fringe bidder i ∈ 1..n submits
a bid bi taking into account their own cost draw, the value of the signal observed,
and the number of participants in the auction.7
6Similar condition arises in the models of auctions with affiliated values. However the models
with affiliated or public values assume that receiving a public signal changes the firms’ beliefs
about her own costs or valuations, and not the beliefs about the competitors’ costs or valuations.
7The number of fringe participant is treated as an exogenous auction characteristic in this
model, however considering an endogenous entry model would be a logical model extension.
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As I would show below, after the signal is observed, and given some regularity
assumptions on the equilibrium bidding strategies and the underlying cost distri-
butions, the problem reduces to a standard asymmetric first price auction with the
regular bidder drawing costs from the distribution F (·|s), and fringe bidders inde-
pendently drawing costs from Z(·). Hence, following Maskin and Riley (2000a) and
Maskin and Riley (2000b), a unique set of monotone equilibrium bidding functions
exists. However the following assumptions are useful for identification purposes.
A1.1. The regular bidder bids according to a bidding function β(c, s), and each of
the fringe bidders bids according to a bidding function ζ(ci, s) in equilibrium.
A1.2. β(c, s) is a monotonically increasing function of both arguments, and a func-
tion β−1(b, s), such that β(β−1(b, s), s) = b exists for any value of s.
A1.3. ζ(ci, s) is a monotonically increasing function of both arguments, and a func-
tion ζ−1(bi, s), such that ζ(ζ−1(bi, s), s) = bi exists for any value of s.
1.3.2 Optimal bidding and equilibrium
To find the optimal bidding strategies of both types of bidders one would solve
for the Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in an asymmetric first price procurement
auction for the cost distributions F (·|s) for the single regular bidder, and Z(·) for
n fringe bidders.
To show this, consider the regular bidder problem:




Similarly to the standard first price auction problem, the first order condition is:
1 =
n(b− c)z(ζ−1(b, s))ζ−11 (b, s)
1− Z(ζ−1(b, s))
, (1.3)
where ζ−11 (·, s) is the derivative of ζ−1 with respect to the first argument.
Assuming there are n fringe bidders in the auction the i’th fringe bidder’s
problem is:
(bi − ci)(1− Z(ζ−1(bi, s)))n−1(1− F (β−1(bi, s)|s))→ max
bi
(1.4)
With the first order condition:
1 =
(n− 1)(bi − ci)z(ζ−1(bi, s))ζ−11 (bi, s)
1− Z(ζ−1(bi, s))
+
(bi − ci)f(β−1(bi, s)|s)β−11 (bi, s)
1− F (β−1(bi, s)|s)
, (1.5)
where β−11 (·, bt−1) is the derivative of β−1 with respect to the first argument.
The pair of functions β(c, s) and ζ(ci, s) satisfying first order conditions (1.3)
and (1.5) constitute a BNE of this game. Since the firms ex post payoffs are linear
in their own type (and hence are supermodular in own and competitor type), and
the firm costs are privately and independently drawn from the distributions with
finite support and a common upper endpoint with a positive mass for each firm type,
according to Maskin and Riley (2000b), Maskin and Riley (2003), and Maskin and
Riley (2000a) this equilibrium would be unique and monotonic in c for the regular
bidder or ci for the fringe bidders.
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1.3.3 Identification
In order to identify the unobserved costs of regular and fringe bidders using the
methodology introduced by Guerre et al. (2000) (GPV), the relationship between
the distribution of bids and the distribution of costs for each of the bidders should be
established. In this section I would show that the standard relationship between the
observed bid distributions and unobserved cost distributions, allowing to eliminate
the bid function derivatives from equations (1.3) and (1.5), hold for this model.
However, the distributions of bids conditional on the signal should be used instead
of marginal bid distributions for both regular and fringe bidders.
Proposition 1.1. The following relationships between the distributions of costs
F (·|s), Z(·), and conditional distributions of bids GR(·|s), GF (·|s), hold if the firms
bid according to equilibrium bidding functions β(c, s) and ζ(ci, s):
1. For the regular bidder:
F (β−1(y, s)|s) = GR(y|s), and
f(β−1(y, s)|s)β−11 (y, s) = gR(y|s)
2. For the fringe bidder:
Z(ζ−1(y, s)) = GF (y|s), and
z(ζ−1(y, s))ζ−11 (y, s) = g
F (y|s)
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Taking into account the relationships in Proposition 1.1 the system of first















This allows the identification of the costs of regular and fringe bidders using
the observed values of bids, signals, and other auction characteristics.
1.4 Structural estimation
I use the parametric structural model introduced by Athey et al. (2011) for
first price auctions with unobserved heterogeneity to estimate the probability dis-
tributions of observed bids. I introduce past bid signal as an observable auction
characteristic, and assume the common parametric functional form of the Gamma-
Weibull distribution for the joint distribution of bids of regular and fringe firms in
both the bridge and the pavement market. Using a parametric method for the esti-
mation of bid distributions helps to alleviate the small size of the data for each of
the realizations of the signal. I use the system of first order conditions (2.1) to calcu-
late pseudo costs, and estimate the conditional distribution of costs for the regular
bidders, and the (marginal) distribution of costs for the fringe bidders nonparamet-
ricaly in both markets. Finally, to illustrate the results of the last estimation step,
I approximate the bidding functions for a particular set of auction characteristics
and contrast the bidding function estimates resulting from the estimation of the
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standard model and the model with the past bid signal.
1.4.1 Parametric estimation of bid distributions
To account for the observed value of the past bid signal explicitly I use a semi-
parametric approach. First I estimate the conditional bid distributions of regular
and fringe bidders parametrically, accounting for the unobserved auction hetero-
geneity.
The bid distributions of regular and fringe bidders are estimated using a
Gamma-Weibull distribution families:




where j = R,F for regular or fringe bidder, and the scale parameters λj and the















In particular, Xj1 and X
j
2 are the observable auction or firm characteristics.
XR1 contains the number of fringe bidders (number of regular bidders is = 1 and
omitted for multicollinearity), and the past bid signal. XR2 contains the number of
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Table 1.7: Gamma-Weibull estimates: Bridge projects
Regular
Scale
Constant 2.1816∗∗∗ (0.1379) 2.2205∗∗∗ (0.1270)
N (fringe) bidders 0.0255 (0.0311) 0.0388 (0.0307)
Lag av bid residual 1.5825∗ (0.8304)
Shape
Constant −0.0154 (0.0341) −0.0332 (0.0354)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0099 (0.0062) −0.0075 (0.0063)
Backlog 0.0765∗ (0.0455) 0.0481 (0.0442)
Distance 0.0817 (0.1519) 0.1101 (0.1612)
Lag av bid residual 0.3864∗∗∗ (0.0929)
Fringe
Scale
Constant 1.9291∗∗∗ (0.0589) 1.9131∗∗∗ (0.0563)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0084 (0.0114) −0.0085 (0.0113)
Regular dummy 0.2813∗∗∗ (0.0431) 0.2763∗∗∗ (0.0429)
Lag av bid residual −0.2615 (0.3257)
Shape
Constant 0.0812∗∗∗ (0.0234) 0.0700∗∗∗ (0.0237)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0033 (0.0055) −0.0017 (0.0056)
Regular dummy −0.0527∗∗∗ (0.0180) −0.0612∗∗∗ (0.0181)
Lag av bid residual 0.3400∗∗∗ (0.0877)
Heterogeneity
ln(θ) −0.0098 (0.0888) 0.0298 (0.0881)
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Asymptotic standard errors
in parentheses.
fringe bidders, backlog, distance to the project, and the past bid signal. XF1 and X
F
2
have the same structure which contains the number of fringe competitors, regular
bidder participation dummy, and the past bid signal.8 The estimation for bridge
and pavement projects is performed separately.
Table 1.7 presents parameter estimates for the bridge projects with the lagged
average bid residual included in X1 and X2 (the unrestricted model) on the left,
and no lagged information (the restricted model) on the right. The lagged average
8Versions with backlog and distance for fringe bidders were estimated and do not change the
estimates much while hurting the standard errors. Versions with ln(θ) depending on past bid signal
st−1 were also estimated and do not change core results.
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Table 1.8: Gamma-Weibull estimates: Pavement projects
Regular
Scale
Constant 2.5248∗ ∗ ∗ (0.1739) 2.4943∗ ∗ ∗ (0.1306)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0182 (0.0408) −0.0106 (0.0400)
Lag av bid residual −0.0392 (0.8240)
Shape
Constant 0.0986∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0343) 0.1006∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0342)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0280∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0078) −0.0273∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0076)
Backlog −0.1455∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0554) −0.1590∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0518)
Distance 0.1232 (0.1688) 0.1224 (0.1676)
Lag av bid residual 0.0520 (0.0732)
Fringe
Scale
Constant 2.2441∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0617) 2.2333∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0548)
N (fringe) bidders 0.0057 (0.0100) 0.0068 (0.0099)
Regular dummy 0.1134∗∗ (0.0512) 0.1147∗∗ (0.0511)
Lag av bid residual −0.0460 (0.1997)
Shape
Constant 0.0917∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0165) 0.0927∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0165)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0190∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0037) −0.0192∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0037)
Regular dummy −0.0578∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0148) −0.0592∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0147)
Lag av bid residual −0.0484 (0.0406)
Heterogeneity
ln(θ) 0.0236 (0.0949) 0.0226 (0.0950)
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Asymptotic standard errors
in parentheses.
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bid residual has a large and statistically significant (at a 10% level and 1% level
accordingly) effect on both the scale and the shape parameter of the regular bidder
bid distribution. The likelihood ratio test rejects the restricted model with p-value
less than 0.0001. Table 1.8 presents parameter estimates for the pavement projects.
The lagged average bid residual does not have a significant effect on any of the
estimates, and in this case the likelihood ratio test does not reject the restricted
model with p-value 0.222. It is also worth noting that the competition between
fringe bidders does not have a significant role in the estimated bid distributions for
the bridge projects, but does enter the estimated bid distributions for the pavement
projects. Also the backlog is more important than the lagged information in the
pavement projects, and does not appear to play a role for the bidding in bridge
projects.
To contextualize the effect that the estimated coefficients for the value of the
past bid signal has on the bid distributions, I plot the estimated bid distributions
for each market and each bidder type conditional on the mean values of all other
observable auction and firm characteristics, and the full range of the value of the
lagged average bid residual in Figures 1.1 through 1.4.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 present the conditional distributions for the regular and
fringe bidders in bridge market with the left panel presenting a 3D view, and the right
panel tracing the mean and variance of the estimated distribution in the bid-signal
space. For both of the bidder types mean value of the distribution is increasing with
the signal, the variance of the regular bidder bid distribution is decreasing with the
signal, and the variance of the fringe bidder bid distribution increases slightly with
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Figure 1.1: Estimated conditional bid distribution for regular bidders in the bridge
market
Figure 1.2: Estimated conditional bid distribution for fringe bidders in the bridge
market
the signal. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 present the conditional distributions of the regular
and fringe bidders in the pavement market. The estimated distributions vary much
less with the value of the past bid signal than in the bridge market. The mean of
the regular bidder bid distribution increases slightly with the value of the signal, the
mean of the fringe bidder distribution does not change significantly. The variance
for both the regular and the fringe bidders stays roughly the same regardless of the
value of the signal.
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Figure 1.3: Estimated conditional bid distribution for regular bidders in the pave-
ment market
Figure 1.4: Estimated conditional bid distribution for fringe bidders in the pavement
market
1.4.2 Estimation of cost distributions
After obtaining the conditional bid distributions for all groups of bidders, I can
use (2.1) to calculate pseudo costs for each observed bid and estimate the correspond-
ing cost distributions nonparametrically. I use the standard kernel density estimator
(1.9) with an optimal bandwidth h = 1.06σ̂n−1/5 for all marginal density estimates
and the one-step conditional density estimator (1.10) with the optimal bandwidth
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matrix [h, hs] = [σ̂n
−1/6, σ̂sn
−1/6] for the estimation of regular bidder conditional dis-
tribution of costs. In both cases I use the Gaussian kernel with boundary correction












Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show the difference between the marginal cost distribution
estimates within the standard model and the model accounting for the presence of
the past bid signal in the first step of the estimation procedure. For both regular and
fringe bidders there is no difference in these estimates for the firms in the pavement
market. In the bridge market, the marginal distribution of costs for the regular
bidder is slightly less precise when we take the past bid signal into account in the
estimation procedure, since some of the observed bid variation would be associated
with the signal variation. The marginal distribution of costs for the fringe bidder is
slightly more precise. In general, there is no big difference in the estimates of the
marginal distribution of costs of both the regular and fringe bidders. In addition
the estimated marginal cost distributions from different models lie within the 95%
confidence interval of each other for both types of the bidders. This changes, how-
ever, if we look at the conditional distributions of regular bidder costs for different
values of the signal.
Figure 1.7 presents the results of the estimation of the regular bidder cost
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Figure 1.5: Marginal pdf’s of regular bidder costs for bridge projects (left) and
pavement projects (right)
Figure 1.6: Marginal pdf’s of fringe bidder costs for bridge projects (left) and pave-
ment projects (right)
Figure 1.7: Conditional and marginal pdf’s of regular bidder costs
(a) Bridge market (b) Pavement market
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Figure 1.8: Conditional distribution of regular bidder costs in the pavement market
distribution conditional on several selected values of the signal observed in the data
along with the marginal distribution of costs and the 95% confidence intervals for
each of the estimates. The estimates for the bridge projects are presented on the left
panel. For this market, though the cost distribution conditional on the median value
of the signal is close to the marginal distribution estimate from the standard model,
conditioning on the extreme values of the signal produces drastically different cost
distribution estimates. In particular, the distribution conditional on the low value of
the signal is significantly more precise and has a lower mean, while the distribution
conditional on the high value of the signal is less precise and gives higher weight for
high cost realizations in the current period. The estimates for the paving projects
are presented on the right panel. The estimated conditional cost distributions for
different values of the signal are closer together than similar distribution estimates
for the bridge projects, have comparable means, and can not be differentiated from
each other with the 95% confidence.
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 present the full range of the estimated conditional distri-
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Figure 1.9: Conditional distribution of regular bidder costs in the pavement market
butions of costs for the regular bidders in the bridge and the pavement market. The
panels on the left present the 3D view of the conditional distribution map, and the
panels on the right trace the maximum of conditional probability distribution func-
tion (which in several cases does not represent the true mean due to dual peaked
pdf estimate) and the variance in the cost-signal space. The estimated conditional
distribution of costs of the regular bridge bidder is visibly more precise at the low
end of the signal, and the mean does not shift between the minimum of the signal
value -0.36 and -0.27. There is a sharp jump in the variance of the estimated dis-
tribution and a steady increase of the distribution mean after that. At the same
time the estimated conditional distribution of costs of the regular pavement bidder
is roughly equally precise for all values of the signal.
As the following bidding function example and the series of counterfactuals
show, the difference in the conditional cost distributions leads to a sufficient differ-
ence in expected bidder behavior, and, as a result, expected procurement costs and
the optimal behavior for the auctioneer.
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1.4.3 Bid function example
After obtaining the estimates of the conditional cost distributions for the reg-
ular bidders and the marginal cost distribution estimates for the fringe bidders one
can attempt to solve a generic asymmetric first price auction for a given number
of fringe bidders numerically using (1.3) and (1.5) with the appropriate boundary
conditions. However it is useful to first look at a simpler approximation of the bid-
ding functions using the parametric estimates of the bid distributions I have already
established to inverse (2.1). This section provides an example of bidding function
estimates for regular and fringe bidders in both the bridge and the pavement market
following this strategy. In each case I estimate the bidding functions for the auctions
with one regular and one fringe bidder, the mean values of backlog and distance for
the regular bidder in the given market, and several different values of the signal
value:
XR1 = [1, st−1];
XR2 = [1,BacklogR,DistanceR, st−1];
XF1 = X
F
2 = [0, 1, st−1].
(1.11)
















Figure 1.10: Bid functions for fringe bidder, low signal, nf = 1


















































which we used to identify the costs earlier, for b and bi using the parametric
distribution of the bidding function and a sufficient number of random cost draws
from the distributions estimated earlier.
Figure 1.10 presents the estimated bidding functions of the fringe bidders after
observing a low value of the past bid signal in the bridge market in the top panel, and
in the pavement market in the bottom panel. The solid line on each panel represents
the bidding function approximated using the standard model, while the dashed lines
represent the bidding functions approximated with the observed signal included in
the model at every estimation stage. In both of the markets the fringe bidders bid
more aggressively if the low signal is observed, yet the fringe bidder would reduce
the bid by up to 10% if the low signal is observed in the bridge market, and only
by roughly 4% in the pavement market.
Similar patterns hold for the regular bidders and different values of the signal.
Figure 2.1 presents a larger set of the bidding function estimates for different types
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of bidders in both the bridge and pavement markets. On each figure the panels on
the left show the bidding functions for the extreme values of the signal observed prior
to the auction: minimal observed signal at the top, and maximal observed signal at
the bottom. The right panels show the bidding function estimates for the median
observed value of the signal, which by construction is close to 0. Since the standard
model does not take the value of the signal into account the solid lines representing
the bidding functions derived from it are the same for the market-bidder type pair
regardless of the value of the signal.
The top row of figures, 1.11a and 1.11b, show the bidding function approxima-
tion for the regular bidders. In the case of one fringe competitor, the regular bidder
strategy approximation differs significantly at lower cost values in the bridge market
when the value of the past bid signal is included in the estimation. As expected,
the regular bidder bids more aggressively if a low value of the signal was observed,
and less aggressively if a high value of the signal was observed. At the same time
there is no significant difference between the approximations of the regular bidder
strategy under different values of the signal being released in the pavement market.
The same pattern is true for the fringe bidders and can be seen in figures
1.11c and 1.11d. The only participating fringe bidder bids more aggressively upon
observing a low signal about the regular bidder costs, and less aggressively upon
observing a high signal in the bridge market. And though there is a slight difference
in the fringe bidder strategy approximations for different signals observed in the
pavement market, they are much smaller. The reaction of the fringe bidders to the
signal is stronger than the reaction of the regular bidder. This can be explained by
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the fact that the signal brings less new information to the regular bidder than to
the fringe bidder, i.e. the variation between possible cost draws for the fringe bidder
are more important for the regular bidder than the shift in the fringe bidder bidding
function in response to the signal being released.
The effect that the past bid signal has on the bidding behavior of both the
regular and the fringe bidders diminishes with competition. Figure 1.12 shows the
estimated bidding functions of the fringe bidders conditional on the low value of
the signal being observed when four fringe bidders participate in the auction, which
is close to the level of competition in an average auction in both markets. With
higher competition from the other fringe bidders the fringe bidder in bridge market,
depicted on the left panel, would reduce her bid by approximately 5% when her
costs are low compared to the 10% reduction when she is a sole fringe bidder in the
auction. The fringe bidders in the pavement market, in the Figure 1.12b, do not
change their bidding strategy conditional on observing a low past bid signal.
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Figure 1.11: Estimated bidding functions for nf = 1
(a) Bridge market, regular bidder
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(b) Pavement market, regular bidder
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(c) Bridge market, fringe bidder
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(d) Pavement market, fringe bidder
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Figure 1.12: Bid functions for fringe bidders, low signal, nf = 4

















































Figure 1.13 shows a set of estimated bidding functions for the auction with
four fringe bidders conditional on several different values of the signal being observed
in both markets. It shows that in the bridge market (Figures 1.13a and 1.13c) the
effect of the past bid information also diminishes with competition for the regular
bidder, and a high value of the signal being observed, yet is still present, especially
for lower cost draws. The effect of the signal on the bidding function in the pavement
market (Figures 1.13b and 1.13d) disappears.
To summarize, in an average auction firms change their bidding strategies
depending on the value of the signal observed in the market with serially correlated
bids, but not in the market with independent bids. When the past bid information
matters, both regular and fringe firms bid more aggressively when a low bid signal
is observed, and less aggressively when a high signal is observed.
Fringe bidders estimated bid functions are affected more strongly by the pres-
ence of the past bid signal in the model than the regular bidders. This can be ex-
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plained by the fact the the regular bidders receive less additional information with
the signal, as they only have to take into account the deviation in the fringe bidders
bidding strategies, while the fringe bidders take into account both the change in
competitor bidding, and the change in their beliefs about the regular bidder costs.
The corrections to the bidding strategies are larger for lower cost draws. Since
both fringe and regular firms with lower cost draws would have higher probability
of winning, they have both more incentives to adjust upwards when a high signal
is observed, and more room to adjust when a low signal is observed. Finally, all of
these effects get smaller when competition grows, but do not completely disappear.
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Figure 1.13: Estimated bidding functions for nf = 4
(a) Bridge market, regular bidder
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(b) Pavement market, regular bidder

















Low past bid signal
s = -0.46854

















Mean past bid signal
s = 0.0093109














































































(d) Pavement market, fringe bidder
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The differences in the bidding function estimates shown in the previous section
are sufficient to imply that the different access to the past bid information may lead
to large differences in the auction outcomes. In this section I use the estimates of
the cost distributions of all players to solve asymmetric first price auctions under
four different information regimes which I would refer to as the standard model,
the public signal model, the näıve auctioneer model, and the informed auctioneer
model. In addition I allow the auctioneer to set a binding reserve price and find the
optimal auction outcomes in terms of minimal expected procurement costs for each
of the four information regimes.
The difference between the four information regimes is summarized in Table
1.9. Each of the models is characterized by whether the auctioneer and/or the fringe
bidders have access to the past bid information and internalize it in their optimiza-
tion decisions. If the fringe bidders have access the the past bid information they
would use the true cost distribution conditional on the value of the signal as their
belief about the regular bidder costs when solving for the optimal bidding function.
If the fringe bidders have no access to the past bid information they would use the
marginal cost distribution as their belief about the regular bidder. In the same way
if the auctioneer observes the past bid information she would use the true condi-
tional cost distribution as her belief about the regular bidder costs. The standard
model assumes that neither the auctioneer nor the fringe bidders have access to the
past bid information, the public signal model assumes that both the auctioneer and
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the fringe bidders have access to this information. The náıve auctioneer and the
informed auctioneer models assume in turn that either the auctioneer or the fringe
bidders do not use the past bid information in their decision-making while the other
party does.



















Informed auctioneer Public signal
1.5.1 Solving for the counterfactual equilibrium and the optimal re-
serve price
In the structural estimation part of this chapter I have implicitly assumed that
the Oklahoma DoT auctions are run without a binding reserve price, and that the
observed bids are generated by either the standard model or the public signal model.
Introducing a binding reserve price would change the system of equations


















with the boundary conditions for the bidding functions:
β−1(R) = ζ−1(R) = R,
β−1(b) = ζ−1(b) = c
(1.14)
Since the closed form solution of this system of differential equations does
not exist in the general case, and both of the equations are not well defined at
the boundary points making standard numerical methods for solving the systems of
differential equations less reliable, polynomial approximation methods are usually
used to solve this type of problem. In particular, I use the method described in
Hubbard et al. (2013a) adjusted for the procurement auctions and the presence of
a binding reserve price.
This method involves approximating the inverse bidding functions by Cheby-
shev polynomials and use the MPEC approach to solve the following problem for
the auction with reserve price R, n fringe bidders, and one regular bidder, assuming
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s.t. β−1(R) = ζ−1(R) = R (a) Left boundary conditions




(c) Right boundary condition for regular
bidder FOC
f(c)β′−1(b) + (n− 1)z(c)ζ ′−1(b) = 1
b− c
(d) Right boundary condition for fringe
bidder FOC
β′−1(R) = ζ ′−1(R) =
n+ 1
n
(e) Left boundary condition for regular
and fringe bidder FOCs
β′−1(b) ≥ 0, ζ ′−1(b) ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ [b, R] (f) Monotonicity






















Conditions (15.c) - (15.e) introduced in Fibich et al. (2002) apply LHospitals
rule to estimate the first order conditions for each bidder type at the boundary
9Though only conditions (a) and (b) are necessary, conditions (c), (d), and (e) hold if the FOCs
are satisfied, and conditions (f) and (g) are assumed for the existence of PBNE in the asymmetric
auction game. Including these conditions improves the quality of the estimates.
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points. Conditions (15.f) and (15.g) define the desirable properties of the solution
and are applied at each approximation point. The KNITRO solver with the help of
the NEOS10 server is used to handle the nonlinear nature and the large number of
the constraints.
After obtaining the estimates for the inverse bidding functions, the expected








which can be rewritten in terms of the expected probability of zero bidders







Φ(x)dx−RΦ(R) + b. (1.19)
Since lowering the reserve price down to the lower bound of the cost support,
c, would bring the expected price of the contract to zero, it is important to account
for the potential harm that holding a void auction can cause the auctioneer. To do
this I introduce a penalty for not determining the contractor in the current round of
auctions. I assume that the auctioneer loses twice the value of the engineer’s estimate
if the auction fails11, and hence the auctioneer the expected cost of procurement
10See Czyzyk et al. (1998), Dolan (2001), and Gropp and Moré (1997) for details on the NEOS
server; Byrd et al. (2006) for using KNITRO for nonlinear optimization.
11Different penalty coefficients were also tested. The results under different values of the penalty
maintain the same order, yet call for less realistic values of the optimal reserve price.
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None 1.08 1.00 1.08 4.0% 2.3%
0.99 0.93 0.98 0.97 2.3% 1.6%
Pavement projects
None 1.07 1.00 1.07 3.4% 2.6%
0.99 0.94 0.99 0.97 2.0% 1.4%
*All reserve prices are optimal reserve prices
calculated as:
EC(R) = EP (R) + 2Φ(R) (1.20)
For each of the information regimes I search for the optimal reserve price by
solving the auctions over a finite grid of candidate reserve prices, calculating the
values of expected contract price and the probability of void auction, and finding
the minimum of EC(R) over this grid.
1.5.2 The standard model
I present the results of the counterfactual simulations starting with the bench-
mark auction outcomes predicted by the standard model in Table 1.10. For each
market the first row shows the simulated outcomes without a binding reserve price,
and the second row shows an optimal reserve price which minimizes the expected
cost of procurement and the simulated auction outcomes under this reserve price.
Under the assumptions of the standard model bridge and pavement market out-
45
comes are very similar both with and without the optimal reserve price, with the
exception of expected firm markups. Setting an optimal reserve price saves 10% of
the engineer’s estimate in the expected costs of procurement in both markets. The
optimal reserve price is the same in both markets, so the auctioneer can set the same
optimal reserve price for both types of auctions.12 Finally, the bidder asymmetry,
as measured by the difference in expected markups, is more prominent in the bridge
market.
1.5.3 The public signal model
Accounting for the presence of the past bid information changes some of the
key model predictions and highlights the difference between the two markets. The
results of the public signal model simulation are presented in Table 1.11. The
simulated auction outcomes in two markets are still similar if there is no binding
reserve price, but diverge significantly when the optimal reserve price comes into
consideration. In particular, the optimal reserve price in the bridge market varies
depending on the signal observed, with the lowest optimal reserve of 92% of the
engineer’s estimate being set when the minimal signal is observed. The optimal
reserve price in the pavement market stays largely the same regardless of the value
of the signal. As a consequence, the simulated auction outcomes under optimal
reserve are vastly different between the bridge and the pavement market, with both
expected price of the contract and expected procurement costs being much lower
12Here and throughout I present the counterfactual results up to second decimal due to the
limited precision of the grid search procedure.
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None 1.06† – 1.22‡ 1.00 1.06† – 1.22‡ 6.9%† – 3.7%‡ 2.1%† – 2.5%‡
0.92† – 0.99‡ 0.88† – 0.93‡ 0.99† - 0.98‡ 0.90† – 0.97‡ 3.4%† – 1.2%‡ 0.9%† – 1.6%‡
Pavement projects
None 1.07† – 1.19‡ 1.00 1.07† – 1.19‡ 2.6%† – 2.3%‡ 2.5%† – 2.2%‡
0.99† – 0.98‡ 0.93† – 0.92‡ 0.99† – 0.98‡ 0.97† – 0.96‡ 1.1%† – 1.5%‡ 1.4%† – 1.3%‡
*All reserve prices are optimal reserve prices ; † Conditional on minimum realization of the signal; ‡ Conditional
on maximum realization of the signal.
when a low value of the signal is observed.
Setting an optimal reserve is even more important within the public signal
model and brings between 16% and 25% of savings in expected costs in the bridge
market, and 10% to 23% in the pavement market.
The asymmetry between bidders in the bridge market is even more prominent
under the public signal model, especially when no binding reserve price is set. At
the same time, the bidders in the pavement market get closer expected markups in
the public signal model than in the standard model.
Finally, using the standard model to simulate the auction outcomes when the
public signal game is played in reality would lead to a misestimation of expected
procurement costs by up to 14% without a binding reserve price, and up to 7% with
the optimal reserve price.
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1.5.4 The näıve auctioneer model
Since the optimal reserve price changes depending on the value of the signal
in the bridge market, failing to account for this information in setting the optimal
reserve price should lead some losses in the expected procurement cost. Comparing
the results of the náıve auctioneer model simulation in Table 1.12 with the results in
Table 1.11 shows that the auctioneer would lose up to 3% in expected procurement
costs or 4% in expected contract price by setting a sub-optimal reserve price in the
bridge market. The fact that the auctioneer does not use all of the information
available also brings additional markups to all firms in the market with the low-
signal regular bidder gaining additional 0.8% compared to the public signal model,
and the fringe bidders gaining between 0.5% and 0.1% depending on the value of the
signal. At the same time the main outcomes of the pavement auctions, including
expected firm markups do not change significantly between the public signal and
the náıve auctioneer model.
1.5.5 The informed auctioneer model
Finally, I estimate the cost of information transparency in each of the markets
by calculating the outcomes of the informed auctioneer model. The results of this
model are presented in Table 1.13.
Concealing the past bid information from the fringe bidders reduces the vari-
ation in the expected costs if no binding reserve price is set in either of the markets.
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None 1.06† – 1.22‡ 1.00 1.06† – 1.22‡ 6.9%† – 3.7%‡ 2.1%† – 2.5%‡
(1.08) (1.00) (1.08)
0.99 0.92† – 0.93‡ 1.00† – 0.98‡ 0.93† – 0.97‡ 4.2%† – 1.2%‡ 1.2%† – 1.7%‡
(0.93) (0.98) (0.97)
Pavement projects
None 1.07† – 1.19‡ 1.00 1.07† – 1.19‡ 2.6%† – 2.3%‡ 2.5%† – 2.2%‡
(1.07) (1.00) (1.07)
0.99 0.93† – 0.93‡ 0.99† – 0.99‡ 0.97† – 0.97‡ 1.1%† – 1.5%‡ 1.4%† – 1.3%‡
(0.94) (0.99) (0.97)
*All reserve prices are optimal reserve prices ; † Conditional on minimum realization of the signal; ‡ Conditional
on maximum realization of the signal; Auctioneer-predicted numbers in parenthesis.












None 1.06† – 1.11‡ 1.00 1.06† – 1.11‡ 3.9%† – 4.1%‡ 2.3%† – 2.3%‡
0.91† – 0.99‡ 0.87† – 0.93‡ 0.91† – 0.98‡ 0.91† – 0.97‡ 1.4%† – 2.3%‡ 1.0%† – 1.6%‡
Pavement projects
None 1.08† – 1.10‡ 1.00 1.08† – 1.10‡ 3.5%† – 3.7%‡ 2.6%† – 2.6%‡
0.99† – 0.99‡ 0.93† – 0.93‡ 0.99† – 0.99‡ 0.97† – 0.96‡ 2.0%† – 1.8%‡ 1.4%† – 1.4%‡
*All reserve prices are optimal reserve prices ; † Conditional on minimum realization of the signal; ‡ Conditional
on maximum realization of the signal.
In the bridge market it also reduces the low-signal regular bidder markup by 3-4%
without the binding reserve price, or 1-2% with the optimal reserve price. It also
reduces the expected procurement costs by 1% compared to the public signal model.
There are no notable differences between the outcomes of the informed auc-
tioneer and the public signal models for the pavement market.
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1.6 Conclusions
This chapter studies the effect of the availability of information about past
auctions on the current auction in two highway procurement markets. I show that
the information about the past bids of the participants has a significant effect on
their bidding behavior in the market for bridge construction and repair projects
where bids, and, consequently, contract fulfillment costs are correlated across time.
In particular, all bidders bid more aggressively if the signal about low cost of one
of the bidders in the previous period was received, and less aggressively if the high
signal was received. There is no significant effect of the past bid information on
bidder behavior in the market for pavement projects where there is no correlation
between firm bids and construction costs over time.
I also show that it is beneficial for the auctioneer to account for the existence of
the dynamic nature of the market when setting the optimal reserve price. Using the
standard model to calculate the optimal reserve price, or in other words, being the
“näıve auctioneer” would bring a loss of 2-3% of the engineer’s estimate in expected
cost of procurement and up to 4% of the engineer’s estimate in expected contract
price in the markets with autocorellated costs.
Throughout the chapter I assume that all players are myopic, and that there
is no endogenous entry to the auction. Relaxing these assumptions might change
the conclusions of this chapter. If the players are not myopic, a forward looking
regular firm might reduce the spread of its bids to conceal the information about its
costs and have an information advantage in the next period. This would reduce the
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effect of the past bid information on current bids. On the other hand, if we allow for
endogenous entry, a low cost signal would deter entry by the fringe bidders, reducing
the gains of releasing the information for the auctioneer. At the same time the high




1.7.1 Sample selection and variable construction
I started with 1181 bridge and pavement auctions in Oklahoma from April 2000
to August 2003. I dropped 209 auctions with less than two recorded bidders, and 76
auctions in which no winner was determined by the Oklahoma DoT. In addition, I
dropped 19 auctions in which the winning bid was either too high (higher than 150%
of the engineer’s estimate), or too low (less than 40% of the engineer’s estimate),
and 8 auctions in which the maximum submitted bid is higher than 250% of the
engineer’s estimate. Since the engineer’s estimate was publicly available to bidders
before the auction, and the winning bids are within reason, these high bids do not
look strategic, and dropping just the extreme bids without dropping the full auction
data would distort the estimates.
1.7.2 Construction of the bid residual
I use the lagged average bid residuals in my estimates. The bid residuals
are constructed from an OLS regression of normalized bids on the set of observed
auction and bidder characteristics including number of plan holders, auction date,
size quintile based on the engineer’s estimate, project location, and the bidder’s
backlog and distance to the project.
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Table 1.14: Construction of the bid residual
Variables Bid divided by eng. estimate








*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Firm ID, date, project size, and project type fixed effects
included
1.7.3 Reduced form regressions with average bid as a signal
Table 1.15: Bridge projects with average bid signal
Full sample Full sample Full sample ID FE Regular bidder Fringe bidders
(1) (2)† (3) (4)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0055∗ −0.0074∗∗ −0.0061∗ −0.0176∗∗ −0.0066∗
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0071) (0.0036)
Distance 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Backlog 0.0017 −0.0153 0.0418∗ 0.0641 −0.0230
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0524) (0.0237)
Lagged average bid 0.2339∗∗∗ 0.1986∗∗∗ 0.2950∗∗∗ 0.2298∗∗∗
(0.0426) (0.0417) (0.0944) (0.0466)
Regular participa-
tion dummy
−0.0357∗∗ −0.0273∗ −0.0030 −0.0272∗
(0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0158) (0.0154)
N 1556 1428 1410 181 1246
adj. R2 0.1220 0.1475 0.2618 0.2054 0.1366
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models include contract size and location fixed effects; † includes firm fixed effects.
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Table 1.16: Pavement projects with average bid signal
Full sample Full sample Full sample ID FE Regular bidder Fringe bidders
(1) (2)† (3) (4)
N (fringe) bidders −0.0107∗∗∗ −0.0115∗∗∗ −0.0108∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0120∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0125) (0.0025)
Distance 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Backlog −0.0260∗ −0.0234 0.0196 −0.1835∗∗∗ −0.0175
(0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0184) (0.0679) (0.0158)
Lagged average bid 0.0264 0.0247 0.0550 0.0217
(0.0308) (0.0302) (0.0971) (0.0323)
Regular participa-
tion dummy
−0.0409∗∗∗ −0.0393∗∗∗ −0.0255∗∗ −0.0406∗∗∗
(0.0093) (0.0103) (0.0120) (0.0104)
N 1441 1378 1356 110 1268
adj. R2 0.1475 0.1461 0.2186 0.2232 0.1444
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models include contract size and location fixed effects; † includes firm fixed effects.
1.7.4 Gamma-Weibul log-likelihood function
The Gamma-Weibul log-likelihood function for a given auction is:









































where nRt is the number of regular bidders (in my application is equal to 0 or 1),
and nFt is the number of fringe bidders.
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1.7.5 Numerical integration details












+ 43f(xN−2) + 59f(xN−1) + 17f(xN)
]
(1.22)
The integration is performed in the bid space since values of the functions
F (ζ−1(b)) and Z(β−1(b)) on the uniform b-grid are calculated in the process of










+ 43Φ(bN−2) + 59Φ(bN−1) + 17Φ(bN)
]
−RΦ(R) + b, (1.23)
where R is the reserve price, b is the minimal calculated bid, and Φ(b) = (1 −
F (ζ−1(b)))(1− Z(β−1(b)))n, and n is the number of participating fringe bidders.
1.7.6 Typical auction documentation published before and after the
auction
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Chapter 2: Partial pooling in repeated auctions with autocorrelated
costs
2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1 I have limited my analysis to the backward-looking model of re-
peated procurement auctions in which the bidder with autocorrelated costs does not
take into account the effect her behaviour in the current auction will have on her
future profits. This assumption is limiting and most likely does not reflect the real
behavior of bidders in repeated auctions. In this chapter I study a simple model
of repeated procurement auctions in which the bidder with autocorrelated costs is
forward-looking. When she chooses the optimal strategy in the first round, she is
balancing the effects her bid would have on the current auction and on the expecta-
tions of other bidders in the next auction. I show that in the model with exogenous
entry the forward looking bidder would always bid higher than in the standard
model. Moreover, an equilibrium in strictly monotonic bidding strategies does not
exist in this game. I also provide an example of a partially pooling equilibrium with
the forward looking bidder pooling towards the weak position (high costs). 1
1Following this result, identification of the forward looking dynamic model from the data used
in Chapter 1 would not have been possible.
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This result expands related results of a number of papers studying repeated
auctions with perfectly persistent types and auctions with resale. Literature on auc-
tions with resale can provide useful intuition and reference for the model presented
in this chapter since the participants of such auctions also care about the way they
would be perceived by their competitors after the initial auction. Similar results
appear in a number of papers on auctions with resale. In particular, Haile (2000)
shows that there is partial pooling at reserve price in auctions with resale if the
bidders get a noisy signal of their true type at the time of the auction. Hafalir and
Krishna (2008) note that if a losing bid is revealed after an asymmetric first price
auction “there is no nondecreasing equilibrium with (partial) pooling” in an auction
with resale.
Existing repeated auctions literature mostly focuses on persistent discrete
player types. Ding et al. (2010) study repeated first price auctions with stable
discrete types and show that there would be “signal jamming”, the practice of the
strong (high value) bidder bidding as the weak bidder, in equilibrium. Bergemann
and Hörner (2018) provide more general results for the case of persistent discrete
types. They show that “a low-revenue pooling equilibrium might exist” if any bid
information is released between auctions, and in case of full bid disclosure “the exis-
tence of a pooling equilibrium rules out the possibility of a separating equilibrium”.
Kannan (2012) show that in the setting of procurement auctions with n bidders
having binary types there exists a semipulling equilibrium in which some low-cost
suppliers bid as high-cost suppliers in the first period.
In this chapter I show that a similar result holds in case of autocorrelated
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continuous types. In particular I show that if only one of the bidders has autocorre-
lated continuous costs in a series of two procurement auctions, no strictly monotone
(separating) equilibrium exists, and if an equilibrium exists, this bidder would be
pooling at the high cost, “pretending” to be a weaker bidder. To obtain this result
I combine the methodology used in the auctions with resale literature with sev-
eral results on comparative statics in asymmetric first price auctions from Lebrun
(1998) and de Castro and de Frutos (2010). I also describe how a partially pooling
equilibrium can be constructed using a particular family of type distributions as an
example.
2.2 Model
Consider a sequence of two sealed bid first price procurement auctions with
(n + 1) bidders participating in each auction. One of the bidders, which I would
call a regular bidder, has autocorrelated costs. In the first period her costs are
drawn from a distribution F1(c) with support [c, c], and in the second period her
costs are drawn from a distribution F2(c|c1) where c1 is the realization of her first
period costs, and F2(c|c1) has the same support as F1(c). Both the first round
and the second round cost distributions are differentiable with the corresponding
probability density functions f1(c) and f2(c|c1). The second period distribution is
“positively related” to the first period costs, in particular, the following assumption
holds:2
2Note that this assumption also implies first order stochastic dominance ordering.
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The other n bidders, which I would call fringe bidders, draw their costs in-
dependently from a distribution Z(c) with support [c, c] and a probability density
function z(c) before each of the auctions. Cost realizations of each of the fringe
bidders are independent across time as well as across bidders. All bids submitted in
the first auction are common knowledge before the second auction starts.
Upon observing the first round bids the fringe bidders would form new expec-
tations about the regular bidder type F̂ (c|b1), where b1 is the regular bidder bid
in the first period. If the bidding strategies in the first periods are strictly mono-
tone these beliefs are true and F̂ (c|b1) = F (c|c1). I would assume that F̂ (c|b1) also
satisfies the monotone hazard rate with respect to b1.
3
2.2.1 Second period solution
In the second period, after b1 = y is observed, the problem reduces to an
asymmetric first price auction where, from the perspective of the fringe bidders
the regular bidder draws costs from F̂2(c2|y), and the fringe bidder draws costs
from Z(c). The exact shape of F̂2(c2|y) depends on whether the fringe bidders can
perfectly identify the costs of the regular bidder from the first period, but from a
perspective of the fringe bidders it is a well-defined distribution. This means that in
3This implies that only non-decreasing bidding strategies can constitute an equilibrium in the
first round, yet they don’t have to be strictly increasing.
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the second period there exists a unique monotone equilibrium {β2R(c2, y); β2F (c, y)}
with the corresponding inverse bidding functions {φ2R(b, y);φ2F (b, y)}. Using Lebrun
(1998) and de Castro and de Frutos (2010) the following comparative statics result
holds when F̂2(c2|y) satisfies the monotone hazard rate assumption (A2.1):
Proposition 2.1. For any y′ > y, and for any c and b:
β2F (c, y




′)|y′) < F2(φ2R(b, y)|y).
(2.1)
Proposition 2.1 implies that fringe bidders would bid more aggressively after
observing a lower bid from the regular bidder regardless of their types. And even
though we can not establish the same order of bidding functions for the regular
bidder, we know that her distribution of second round bids would would follow a
first order stochastic dominance with respect to her first period bids. Using the first
part of proposition 2.1 also allows to provide useful comparative statics result for
the second round payoffs of the regular bidder:
Proposition 2.2. If F̂2(c2|y) satisfies the monotone hazard rate assumption ex-
pected profit of the regular bidder in the second period is an increasing function of
her first period bid.
Proof. The interim second round expected profit of the regular bidder is:
Π∗2(y) = max
b2




′)) < Z(φ2F (b2, y)) ∀y′ > y,
hence:
(b2 − c2)(1− Z(φ2F (b2, y′))) > (b2 − c2)(1− Z(φ2F (b2, y))) ∀y′ > y, ∀b2
And Π∗2(y
′) > Π∗2(y).
2.2.2 First period problem
First, assume that there exists an equilibrium in strictly increasing bidding
strategies in the first round auction {β1R(c); β1F (c)}, with corresponding inverse bid-
ding functions {φ1R(c);φ1F (c)}. Then the equilibrium condition for the fringe bidder
follows that of the standard asymmetric first price auction:












However The regular bidder problem for the first round auction would include
expected second period profits, since they also depend b1. Assuming no intertem-
poral discounting, the regular bidder expected profits are:
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Π(b1) = [b1 − c1][1− Z(φ1F (b1))]n + Ec1,b1 Π∗2(b1). (2.3)
The set of first order conditions defining the BNE of the game is:



















With standard boundary conditions:
φ1F (b) = φ
1
R(b) = c,
b = c, and




Proposition 2.3. The pair of strictly increasing functions φ1F (b) and φ
1
R(b) satisfy-
ing conditions (2.4) and (2.5) at any point of their support [b, c] does not exist.
Proof. Following Hubbard et al. (2013b) and Fibich et al. (2002), several additional
boundary conditions should be added, noting that the first order conditions (2.4)
should hold at b and b as well as at all interior points. Evaluating these conditions





































































However in the presence of additional second round profits the first order
condition for the regular bidder can only hold is the derivative of expected profit
at the upper boundary is equal to zero. This contradicts Proposition 2.2 implying
that the equilibrium in monotonic strategies does not exist in this game. Since
the proof of Proposition 2.4 did not depend on the existence of a monotone bidding
function for the regular bidder, this also implies that if an equilibrium exists, all bids
submitted by the regular bidder are higher that those of the standard equilibrium,
and any pooling should happen at the higher end of the cost distribution.
Let βR(c) and φR(c) be the equilibrium bidding and inverse bidding functions
of the regular bidder in the standard asymmetric first price auction with own cost
distribution of F1(c) and the fringe bidder cost distribution of Z(c). Then the
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following proposition is true.
Proposition 2.4. The regular bidder overbids in the first period of the repeated
auction model compared to the standard auction model:
β1R(c) > βR(c) ∀c ∈ (c, c).
Proof. In the standard model the regular bidder solves the problem
Π∗1(b1) = max
b1
[b1 − c1][1− Z(φ1F (b1))]n
with ∂Π1(b1)
∂b1












= 0. Following proposition 2.2 the second term in
this equation is greater than zero, which means that the first term must be less than
zero and the solution of the first round of the repeated game must lie on the right
from the solution of the standard game. Or, in other words, β1R(c) > βR(c).
Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 combined together let me state the following main
result:
Proposition 2.5. The equilibrium in strictly increasing bidding strategies {β1R(c); β1F (c)}
does not exist in the first stage game. If an equilibrium of the first stage game exists,
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the regular bidder would be at least partially pooling at the high type.
2.3 Example: Beta distribution family
Since no analytic solution for the general problem can be found, it is useful to
consider a tractable example showing both the construction of the partially pooling
equilibrium in the first round auction and the consequences of using monotonic
functions solving (2.4) and (2.5) numerically instead of true equilibirum bidding
functions. In this section I would assume that in the first period both types of
bidders are symmetric with costs independently drawn from a uniform distribution
with support [0,1]. In the second period the regular bidder draws her costs from a
distribution which depends on her first period costs. In particular, I would consider
a family of Beta distributions with the first shape parameter equal to 1, and and




). The fringe bidders draw their
costs in the second period from the same uniform distribution with support [0,1]
independently of their first period costs, or any of the competitor costs.



















This distribution family has several useful properties in relation to my model
setup:
• It has support [0,1] regardless of the value of the parameters;
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• It has a clear stochastic ordering with respect to both c1 and α;
• For any invertible bid in the first period it allows to solve a standard asym-





) = 1 − (1 − c)
α
c1 satisfies the monotone hazard rate
assumption
Proof. Note that the hazard rate conditional on a realization of first price costs












∀y′ > yand∀c ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2.7. In an asymmetric first price auction with one regular bidder draw-
ing her costs from the distribution Beta(1, α
c1
) and n fringe bidders drawing their
costs from the distribution U(0, 1) there exists an equilibrium in strictly increasing







, for the regular bidder,
φ2F (b) = b
n+ α/y
α/y + n− 1
− 1
α/y + n− 1
, for the fringe bidder
(2.9)
Proof. With the regular bidder drawing her costs from Beta(1, α
c1
), and fringe bid-





















Plugging in the candidate solutions in the system of first order conditions
above verifies the statement of the proposition.
This means that, assuming that the fringe bidder’s expectations about the
regular bidder’s bidding in the first round are φ1R(b, y), the expected second period






(1− b2)(α/φ1R(b1) + n)
















)2 α/φ1R(b1) + n

























(n− 1)φ1R(b) + α
(2.11)
In the first round the regular bidder solves the problem:
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And the set of equations defining the equilibrium inverse bidding functions in














I proceed to solve the system of equations (2.13) numerically using the stan-
dard Hubbard et al. (2013b) methodology described in Chapter 1 for various values
of α and n. Figure 2.1 shows the resulting bidding functions for n = 1 along with
the solution of a symmetric auction with standard uniform cost distributions for ref-
erence. The regular bidder always bids higher than both the fringe bidder and the
standard symmetric bidder. The higher is the value of α, the lower is the correlation
between first period and second period costs of the regular bidder, and the closer
are the first round simulated bidding functions to the standard one-shot symmetric
auction.
However we can also see that the simulated bidding function do not constitute
an equilibrium by finding best response functions to each of the proposed solutions.
In particular, plugging in the simulated φ1F (b) and φ
1
R(b) into the regular bidder
problem for n = 1 and numerically finding optimal b1 that solves:
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for each c1 shows that the assumption of monotone first round bidding strategies
is violated, especially for low values of α. Figure 2.2 shows the regular bidder best
response functions along with the simulated monotone bidding functions for various
values of α. For values below 0.3 the best response function is fully pooling at
φ1R(b) = b = c = 1. At α = 0.5 there is some partial pooling at the right end of the
best response function. The pooling interval reduces with α but is present even for
high values.
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Figure 2.1: Bidding functions for different values of α
(a) α=0.01 (b) α=0.02
(c) α = 0.5 (d) α = 1
(e) α = 5 (f) α = 10
Theoretical intuition for this result can be obtained by explicitly applying the
Hubbard et al. (2013b) and Fibich et al. (2002) boundary conditions and evaluating
(2.13) at points b and b = 1 and taking into account the boundary conditions for
the inverse bidding functions (φ1F (b) = φ
1
R(b) = c = 0, and φ
1




Figure 2.2: Bidding functions for different values of α
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Evaluated at the lower boundary, (2.13) would provide additional conditions
for the shape of φ1F (b) and φ
1
R(b) at the lower boundary:
(b− 0)φ1′R(b)− (1− 0) = 0
(b− 0)φ1′F (b)− (1− 0) +
φ1′R(b)














Evaluated at the upper boundary, however, (2.13) shows that there should be
some pooling by the regular bidder, which contradicts our initial assumption about
the monotonicity of the equilibrium:
(1− 1)φ1′R(b)− (1− 1) = 0





We can use L’Hospital rule to estimate the first equation in (2.17) providing
additional condition on φ1′R(b) = 2 or φ
1′
R(b) = 0, however the second equation can
only hold if φ1′R(b) = 0.
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2.4 Partially pooling solution for the Beta distribution family
In this section I describe the algorithm for finding a partially pooling solution
for a selected Beta distribution. In particular I assume that α = 0.5, and in the first
period the regular bidder bids according to some monotonic function β1R(c) up to a
cut-off point ĉ and 1 after this cut-off point. Since the first round bidding function
of the regular bidder is not invertable at 1, the beliefs of the fringe bidder in the
second round have to be corrected to solve the second round auction appropriately.4
F̂2(c|b1) =





1−ĉ , if b1 = 1.
(2.18)
Despite the changes in the fringe bidder beliefs about the regular bidder costs,
the second round auction is still a standard asymmetric first price procurement auc-
tion and a unique monotonic equilibrium exists for any given value of b1. Moreover,
for any c1 = y < ĉ and b1 < 1 the solution of the auction is still described by (2.9).
When b1 = 1 the solution of the second round auction satisfies the following system














where HR(c) is the hazard ratio for the regular bidder conditional on b1 = 1.
4The analytical expression for the integral in (2.18) involves the exponential integral special
function and is not very useful. I would use the integral form in further derivations and a numerical
approximation for the simulated solutions.
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Figure 2.3 shows the numerical solutions for this system of equations for dif-
ferent values of ĉ, α = 0.5, and n = 1. It is clear that for high values of ĉ both
bidding functions are increasing with ĉ, but the relation is less clear for the lower
values of ĉ. Figure 2.4 shows the expected profits of the regular bidder in the second
round auction conditional on b1 = 1 as a function of ĉ. As we can see it is not a
monotone function of ĉ and it is minimized at ĉ ≈ 0.5.
Figure 2.3: Second round bidding functions for b1 = 1, α = 0.5, and several values
of ĉ
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Figure 2.4: Expected profits of the regular bidder in second round auction, α = 0.5,
n = 1
In the first round the regular bidder would balance the profits from the first
round auction with the expected profits from the second round auction and is un-
likely to chose a low value of ĉ. So we might expect the optimal cut-off value to be
above 0.5.
To solve the first round problem, first assume that the regular bidder bids
according to some monotonic function β1R(c) if her first period costs are less than
the cut-off value ĉ, and 1 if her costs are greater or equal than ĉ.
Proposition 2.8. If the regular bidder is playing the partially pooling strategy, the
fringe bidders would play a strictly increasing strategy in the equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that the regular bidder is playing a partially pooling strategy with
the strictly increasing inverse bidding function φ1R(b), φ
1
R(1) = ĉ, φ
1
R(0) = 0, and
bids 1 whenever her costs are above ĉ. If n > 1 the fringe bidders would have no
incentives to play a partially pooling strategy, since they will be competing with
other fringe bidders who don’t value the future and have incentives to undercut the
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bid b = 1 whenever their cost draw is below 1. If n = 1 the expected profits of the
fringe bidder bidding some b < 1 are:
ΠF (b, c) = (b− c)(1− ĉ+ (1− φ1R(b))ĉ),
and, if the ties are decided by a fair coin flip, her expected profits when bidding 1
are:
ΠF (1, c) = (1− c)
1− ĉ
2
Since for any ĉ > 0:
ΠF (b, c) =(b− c)(1− φ1R(b)ĉ) ≥ (b− c)(1− ĉ2)







the left hand side is a decreasing function of c and for any b there exists a threshold
ĉF such that:
ĉF =
2b(1 + ĉ)− 1
1 + 2ĉ
such that the fringe bidder prefers the mixed strategy whenever c ≥ ĉF . At b = 1
this means that ĉF = 1 and the fringe bidder plays a strictly increasing bidding
strategy in the equilibrium.
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If the fringe bidder is playing a strictly increasing equilibrium strategy φ1F (b),
expected profits of the regular bidder are:
ΠR(b, ĉ) =

Π∗2(ĉ), if b = 1;
(b− c)(1− φ1F (b))n + Π2(b), if b1 < 1.
(2.20)
where Π∗2(ĉ) is the expected second round profit from the pooling signal shown in
figure (2.4), and Π2(b) is the expected second round profit from signal φ
1
R(b) = c.
Equilibrium threshold value ĉ is defined by equality:






(n− 1)φ1R(b) + α
(2.21)
In case of n = 1:







However in this example the right hand side of equation (2.22) is maximized
at ĉ = 0 with the value 0.25, which is below the minimum value of Π∗2(ĉ). Hence no
equilibrium exists in an auction with one fringe bidder. 5
A partially pooling equilibrium would exist if more than one fringe bidder
is participating in the auctions. Similar solution strategy can be used to find the
threshold values of ĉn for higher values of n. For example, Figure 2.5 shows numerical
solutions of the second round auction for selected values of α and n = 2.
5Alternatively, we might assume that the ties are always broken in favor of the fringe bidder.
Then multiple equilibria with both the regular and the fringe bidder bidding b = 1−
√
Π∗2(0) would
exist in this game.
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Figure 2.5: Second round bidding functions for b1 = 1, α = 0.5, 2 fringe bidders,
and several values of ĉ
Applying condition (2.21) for these solutions and n = 2, graphically shown in
Figure 2.6, would provide the value of ĉ∗2 = 0.0358. As shown in Figures 2.7 and 2.8
the solutions for three and seven fringe bidders are ĉ∗3 = 0.0656 , and ĉ
∗
7 = 0.2666.
To finish constructing a partially pooling equilibrium one would solve the
following system of differential equations numerically:












φ1F (b) = φ
1
R(b) = 0,




Though the unique solution to such system exists, the fact that the system is
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not fully fixed at the lower end of support, and the functions we are seeking have
different supports make standard solution numerical solution methods unstable.
Figure 2.6: Expected profits of the regular bidder in second round auction with two
fringe bidders: ĉ∗ = 0.0358
Figure 2.7: Expected profits of the regular bidder in second round auction with
three fringe bidders: ĉ∗ = 0.0656
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have studied a simple two-period model of repeated procure-
ment auction with autocorrelated costs and forward-looking bidders. I have shown
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Figure 2.8: Expected profits of the regular bidder in second round auction with
three fringe bidders: ĉ∗ = 0.2666
that in this model the equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies does not exist in
the first time period. In particular, the bidder with autocorrelated type would have
incentives to hide her true type in the earlier period partially pool at her weakest
type in equilibrium.
I have also provided equilibrium solutions for several examples of two-period
auction games with mostly symmetric players, and shown that the bidder with
persistent type would pool towards the higher type even if the competition is high.
This result provides an extension of previously existing literature on repeated
auctions with persistent bidder types, and can inform future work concerning auction
transparency and estimation of data from repeated auctions.
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Chapter 3: The role of information in repeated procurement auc-
tions: monitoring and entry
3.1 Introduction
On Jan 1, 2011, Russian public procurement system experienced a change in
the rules of publishing information. Before this date the information was published
in a decentralized manner, separated into municipal (published mostly offline or on
the municipal administration website), regional (published on regional procurement
websites), and federal (published on the federal procurement website). Since Jan 1,
2011, all the information is published on the federal website in a unified format.
This shift makes acquiring information about upcoming and past auctions
cheaper both for the firms considering entering and for the regulators monitoring
the procurement system for the cases of possible corruption. From the point of
view of policy makers increased information should increase competition and reduce
procurement costs through both of these channels. However in a repeated auction
setting releasing information about past auctions might have adverse effects on com-
petition both by facilitating collusion and by providing incumbents with additional
instruments to deter entry. Although better information about upcoming auctions
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induces entry, information about past auctions allows bidders to coordinate, and
may discourage entry by weaker bidders if they observe a strong incumbent in sim-
ilar past auctions.
I suggest that in a repeated auction framework firms make not only entry and
bidding decisions, but also monitoring decisions in each period of time. If a firm
wants to participate in an auction it has to acquire information about upcoming
auctions. It can also get information about past auctions’ outcomes and use this
information while making entry and bidding decisions. Increase of information trans-
parency lowers monitoring costs, the costs of acquiring both types of information.
The existence of third-party firms that specialize in collecting information about
procurement auctions and selling it to potential entrants can serve as an anecdotal
evidence of existence of monitoring costs in the system.
In this chapter I study the effect of increased information transparency on entry
and bidding decisions in repeated public procurement auctions for gasoline service
contracts in one of the Russian regions. I use the difference in the role of monitoring
for big and small firms and the variation in their entry and bidding decisions to
provide some reduced form evidence of the ambivalent role of increasing information
transparency. I also suggest an (incomplete) structural model showing the different
effects that the policy change had on the different types of firms participating in
this market. The results of the estimation of a static model with selective costly
entry suggest that the new information policy changed entry costs benefiting the
large federal firms and potentially decreasing competition. However the resulting
estimates of cost distributions before and after the policy change are significantly
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different for the same types of firms suggesting that a more comprehensive model
incorporating forward-looking behavior by some or all firms is needed to reflect the
data.
Related literature can be separated into four main groups: evaluation of in-
formation disclosure policy for procurement auctions; endogenous entry in one-shot
auctions; bidding and entry behavior in repeated auctions with no entry costs; and
theoretical models of repeated auctions with monitoring. Coviello and Mariniello
(2014), Leslie and Zoido (2011), Ohashi (2009), De Silva et al. (2008) evaluate the
effects of various rules of disclosing information about procurement auctions in Italy,
Argentina, Japan and USA. Ohashi (2009) and De Silva et al. (2008) study the ef-
fects of providing more precise information about the costs of performing a public
work on entry and bidding behavior. Ohashi (2009) finds both an increase in num-
ber of entrants and decrease in price of contracts due to improved information; De
Silva et al. (2008) find reduced information asymmetries between “entrants” and
“incumbents”, but no proof of increased overall entry. Since public works (such
as construction, repair, gardening etc.) are associated with common costs for all
firms, the policies studied in both papers are aimed at reducing ex ante information
asymmetries between different types of bidders, and between the buyers and the
bidders. In my chapter I would focus on auctions for a simple product (gasoline)
with well defined characteristics which I assume to be private cost auctions. Yet
these papers provide useful insights in possible reduced form techniques (differences-
in-differences) as well as an example of ambiguous results of increasing information
transparency on auction outcomes. Papers by Coviello and Mariniello (2014), and
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Leslie and Zoido (2011) are studying private value auctions and are focused on the
effect of publicity on auction outcomes. Coviello and Mariniello (2014) use a re-
gression discontinuity design to show that entry and winning rebate are lower in
auctions with reserve prices below 500,000 euros which are publicized on local bul-
letin boards in Italian municipalities than for auctions with reserve prices above
500,000 euros which are publicized in a number of regional newspapers. Leslie and
Zoido (2011) study the effect of “informational entrepreneurs”, the third-party firms
that sell bundled auction announcements to potential bidders, on auction outcomes
in Buenos Aires. They show that firms that buy information services enter into
auctions with less competitors, and as a consequence bid less aggressively, but the
appearance of informational entrepreneurs reduces costs of procurement by 2.9%.
The second group of related papers models one-shot auctions with costly entry
and estimates the entry costs. Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), and Athey et al.
(2011) use a model of non-selective endogenous entry suggested by Levin and Smith
(1994) (LS). It is assumed that potential entrants do not know their private values
(or costs in the case of procurement auctions) before making an entering decision.
Both papers model two types of firms differing in the distribution of their values
either because of the difference in the size of the firms or because of bid preferences
provided by the auctioneer. The empirical parts of the papers focus on highway
procurement and timber auctions in various US states respectively. In both types
of auctions only general information about the auctioned work contract or tract is
publicly released and firms have to pay a small fee to acquire further information.
This allows to observe the number of “planholders” or firms choosing to “cruise the
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tract” and assume that all of these firms are potential entrants in the auction game,
while firms that submit bids are actual entrants. Yet the “planholders” represent
an already refined group of firms that chose to incur costs of acquiring further
information, and in the logic of my chapter are firms that made a positive monitoring
decision, paid the monitoring cost, and as a result of this monitoring know that they
are eligible to take part in the auction. Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) model and
parametrically simulate the consequences of a bid preference program with selective
entry following Samuelson (1985) (S) model. Under Samuelson assumption potential
entrants learn their private values before making the entry decision so that only firms
with valuations higher than a certain threshold (or costs lower than threshold in case
of procurement auctions) are participating in the auction. Roberts and Sweeting
(2010) model and parametrically estimate partially selective entry allowing potential
entrants to observe signals affiliated with their private valuations prior to making
entry decision. Li and Zheng (2012) suggest a method of discriminating between
selective and non-selective entry models and provide evidence in favor of selective
entry in timber auctions.
Although assuming that there is at least some degree of selection in entry
decision seems natural, the truncated nature of observed bids make identification of
the entry costs and distribution of bids difficult. Gentry and Li (2014) show that if
the number of potential entrants, number of bidders and full set of bids is observed
the bounds on the entry costs and conditional distribution of values can be identified
in the affiliated signal model. These bounds would collapse to point estimates if the
variation in entry is continuous (there exists a continuous auction level instrument),
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and if entry is non-selective (LS), but not if entry is fully selective (S).
In this chapter I am focusing on the impact of accumulated information and
the repeated nature of procurement auctions on entry decisions. Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer (2000) and Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2007) (JBP) suggest a model of
repeated procurement auction in which past actions taken by the firm accumulated
in a state variable affect its bidding decisions in the current auction. Jofre-Bonet
and Pesendorfer use firms’ backlog as such state variable, Balat (2013) allows for
more general intertemporal links in private costs, Groeger (2014)allows for entry
costs that depend on the state variable. The estimation of JBP model relies on
observing the state variable for all regularly participating firms and the distribution
of bids conditional on the state variable.
Finally, as monitoring provides potential entrants with information about past
auctions, I have to make certain assumptions on the way this information may be
used. Papers by Danak and Mannor (2009), Han et al. (2009), Figliozzi et al.
(2008) build and simulate models of repeated auctions with monitoring and provide
some insight to deriving the expected upcoming auction characteristics with both
perfectly and boundedly rational potential participants.
In this chapter I provide some evidence of ambiguous effect of increased infor-
mation transparency on key auction outcomes (participation and costs of procure-
ment) which might be attributed to the presence of asymmetric monitoring costs. I
further suggest a model of repeated auction with monitoring and endogenous entry
by building up on the JBP model of repeated procurement auction.
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3.2 Data and institutional environment
I start with the data from approximately 7000 sealed bid and open bid gasoline
procurement auctions in Sverdlovsk region of Russia conducted in 2008-20131. Prior
to January 2011 both calls for bids and auction protocols were publicized on different
levels depending on financing features of the organization. Municipal procurements
were published on either municipal or regional procurement website; regional pro-
curements were published on regional websites; federal procurements were published
separately on a centralized federal website. The information about auctions from
2008 to 2011 is obtained from a number of archived municipal administrations web-
sites and the regional procurement website for Sverdlovsk region. Auctions after
Jan 2011 are obtained from the centralized federal procurement website2.
Starting from January 2011 two changes to the procurement system were im-
plemented. First, the information about procurements of any level is published on a
centralized website, potentially decreasing monitoring efforts for all interested par-
ties. Second, electronic applications for both sealed bid and open bid auctions were
introduced, potentially reducing entry costs for all bidders.
A typical gasoline procurement auction is run to provide cars owned by a
government or government-financed organization3 with gasoline supplied through
1Sverdlovsk region is chosen for several reasons. It is consistently in top-10 Russian regions by
gross regional product, has substantial population density so that consumer market for gasoline
suppliers is of more importance than government contracts, yet has not many big federal buyers
with potentially large bargaining power (unlike buyers in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Tatarstan),
finally the pre-2011 data for the region is relatively well preserved.
2Data published on the federal website prior to Jan 2011 is currently not available, though
might be used as a control grouped if ever obtained. This makes the set of buyers covered by the
data after 2011 about 10% larger than those covered before 2011.
3Such as a local administration, school, or hospital.
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existing gas stations in a particular locality. At least two weeks before the auction
the procurer has to publish auction documentation which specifies area and duration
of service, amount of gasoline demanded, the type of auction (open or sealed bid),
and the place and time that this auction would take place in. An example of such
procurement auction is described below.
A local police station buys 14300 liters of AI92 gasoline to be supplied over the
second quarter of 2009 through gas stations within municipality borders. Figure 3.1
shows the procurer labeled with tax-payer id, area of service, and local gas stations
labeled with green dots. There are 5 eligible bidders. The call for bids was published
on April 2, 2009 on the regional website. It specified the duration of service (during
second quarter), area of service (within municipality borders), reserve price 267670
RUB which is approximately 3% higher than the market price of this volume of
AI92 at the time of auction, and the date and time by which bids should be received
by the procurer (April 8, 18:00). Two bidders submitted their bids, but one of
them was excluded from the auction since it had no stations in the service area.
The only remaining bidder was announced the winner with the price 265980 (2.3%
higher than the market price). On April 10 the protocol was published on the same
website.
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Figure 3.1: Krasnoturyinsk police station procurement
Sealed bid and open bid auctions run by standard rules with a public reserve
price. In a sealed bid auction bidders submit their bids and supporting documents
(such as safety certificates, list of stations in operation etc.) either in an envelope
or electronically, the buyer opens the bid packages at a designated time, decides
whether all bidders satisfy auction requirements and announces the bidder who
submitted the lowest admitted bid the winner. In an open bid auction firms register
to bid and submits supporting documents before the beginning of the auction, buyer
decides and announces whether all bidders satisfy auction requirements. At the
predefined time of the auction admitted bidders submit their descending bids either
in person or electronically until no bidder is willing to submit another bid. The
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last bid is announced the winning bid and the winner receives the amount of this
bid as his payment4. Buyers have to conduct open bid auctions if the reserve price
is above 500,000 RUB (˜$15,500 by 2011 exchange rate), they are free to choose
between sealed bid and open bid auction if the reserve price is below this threshold5.
Auction results are protocoled and published within three days after the auction and
contain the information about bidder identities, winner identity, winning bid, and
sometimes second and subsequent bids. Procurer has the right to exclude a bidder
from the auction if certain documentation is not supplied or if bidder doesn’t satisfy
criteria of the contract (for example, if bidder doesn’t have stations in the specified
service area). Bidders in an open bid auction can apply but not submit any bids. The
information about excluded bidders is published in the protocols. The information
about non-active bidders is not necessarily published and in some cases the identity
of a non-active bidder is unknown.
An important feature of the data is the variation in potential number of bid-
ders across auctions in the same municipality and sometimes for the same buyer.
Some buyers change the definition of area of service over time, providing exogenous
variation in the number of potential bidders6. The aforementioned police station
4In practice open auctions have a discrete bid step initially equal to 5% of reserve price and
reducing by 0.5% of reserve price each time there are no new bids in a given round. Here I would
assume that the bids in open bid auctions are continuos and hence open bid first price auction can
be treated as a second price sealed bid auction if there are two or more bidders present.
5No auction is necessary if the reserve price is below 50,000 RUB, or total quarterly spending
on a given type of product is below 500,000RUB, or if the buyer can prove that the purchased
good is a product of local monopoly. These small purchaces are rare in gasoline procurement and
are not a part of the data set.
6The degree of freedom that definition of area of service and the reserve price gives to the
buyer might be used for implicitly executing preferences that the buyer has over potential entrants
(for corrupt or benevolent resons). But for the purpose of this chapter I would ignore strategic
considerations that the buyers might have.
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defined are of service within city limits in 2008, first half of 2009, and after second
half of 2011. It conducted four auction with area of service defined as “within 2
km radius” (blue circle on Figure 3.2) in 2009 cutting down the number of potential
entrants to 3, and four auctions “within 4 km radius” in 2010 with 4 eligible bidders.
3.2.1 North subsample
Since defining the volume demanded, area of service and the number and
identity of potential bidders for each auction is labor-intense, I will be using a
small subsample of 348 auctions in eight municipalities in the north of the region.
Appendix 1 shows the geographic area covered by the subsample (top of Figure
3.6) and the locations of buyers and gas stations in the covered area and reasonable
vicinity (bottom of Figure 3.6)7. There are 46 procurers from 8 municipalities in the
sample, each conducting 1 to 28 auctions from 2009 to 2013. 13 of these procurers
are “federal” organizations8.
One of the main concerns about the data is missing information for some
procurers. To see if it affects my subsample I study the changes in volume of
gasoline demanded over time (Appendix 3). Although it doesn’t seem to be an issue
for the whole subsample since there seems to be no substantial break in demand
patterns over the years(Figure 3.7), it affects municipality level data (Figure 3.8).
7This area consistes of both small and medium municipalities and is separated from the rest of
the region which makes definition of areas of service simpler. In further data collection process I
will add municipalities moving south from the current subsample border.
8These include prisons, extra-territorial police units and tax agencies. The presence of federal
buyers in the subsample is higher than in the full sample since prisons are clustered around two
of the municipalities: Ivdel and Gari. Though if this adds a bias to my reduced form results, the
bias should be in my favor since no big firms take part in “prison auctions”.
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Figure 3.2: Krasnoturyinsk police station: variation in area of service
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Two of the municipalities don’t show up in the pre-2011 data at all, suggesting that
they used alternative methods of publishing information, Ivdel is severely affected
by the lack of pre-2011 federal data and has more auctions for higher volumes of
gasoline documented after 2011. One municipality has no data after 2008 which
may be explained by local administrative reforms.
Appendix 2 presents summary statistics for the subsample (Table 3.7), pre-
2011 part of the subsample (Table 3.8) and post-2011 part of the subsample (Table
3.9). Some important features of the data include low participation rates (there
is no auction with more than 4 bidders, and no auction with more than 3 active
bidders), prevalence of sealed bid auctions for both pre- and post-2011 periods, and
a shift to smaller auctions with better reserve prices closer to current market prices
for the same bundles of gasoline at the time of auction after 2011. The shift to
sealed bid auctions and to the smaller contracts can be linked since the choice of
auction format depends on the reserve price. The shift to smaller contracts can
be explained by reduced costs of conducting an auction and by the shift to fewer
centralized auctions, for example Severouralsk administration used to buy gasoline
for several city hospitals before 2011 and after 2011 hospitals run these auctions
separately. In this chapter I would ignore possible strategic behavior of the buyers.
Since the number of active bidders is low in the observed auctions I also look at
the summary statistics by number of bidders (Table 3.10). There are less auctions
with no entry after 20119. Auctions with no entry have higher dispersion of reserve
9Although there is no zero-entry auctions in the subsample after 2011, they do exist in the full
sample.
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prices, but no other obvious differences from auction with nontrivial entry. Also
there are significantly more open bid auctions among auctions with only one active
bidder after 2011 which might be explained by higher visibility of “big efficient firm”
presence in big auctions after the introduction of new information policy which scares
off other potential entrants.
3.3 Reduced form strategy and results
In this section I estimate the results of policy change for two key auction out-
comes: entry and price of the auction. I start by running naive OLS regressions of
relative price of the procurement contract10 and winning discount11 on the policy
dummy variable and the set of auction characteristics. The results of these regres-
sions are presented in Table 3.1. They show that the mean relative price is higher
when I control for the relative reserve price and the mean discount is lower after
the introduction of the new information policy12. Or, in other words, the average
cost of gasoline procurement goes up after the introduction of the new information
policy.
10Relative price is equal to the ratio of winning bid to the average market price of the contract
at the Sverdlovsk region station at the time of the auction.
11Winning discount is equal to the difference between relative start price and relative winning
price.
12It also shows that the variation in relative reserve price explains most of the variation in final
relative price, so if we take into account the changes in buyer behavior the estimation of policy
results might be different since summary statistics in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that reserve prices
are consistently set closer to market prices after 2011.
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Intercept 1.0806*** 0.1953*** 0.0121
(0.0178) (0.0411) (0.0115)
After -0.0082 0.0125** -0.0174***
(0.0100) (0.0063) (0.0065)






N bidders -0.0158** -0.0193*** 0.0201***
(0.0072) (0.0045) (0.0047)
N products 0.0054 0.0052 -0.0052
(0.0054) (0.0034) (0.0035)






Observations 321 321 321
R-squared 0.077 0.645 0.090
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses.
If firms have to pay monitoring costs to obtain information about auctions in
our sample the policy would have different effect for small local firms and big firms
that have stations both inside and outside the region. For local firms that have
stations in one or several geographically close municipalities new policy means a
switch to a new website that provides information about the same set of upcoming
auctions. Although the quality of information provided might be slightly higher
reducing monitoring costs this change should be relatively small. For bigger firms
operating stations in several regions the new policy means a reduction in number
of sources they have to monitor significantly reducing monitoring costs per auction.
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The asymmetric reduction of monitoring costs should facilitate entry for big firms.
As the monitoring efforts don’t change for the small firms their entry is either
unchanged, or reduced if they are faced by new competition from the big firms and
chose to abandoned these auctions. The lower monitoring costs should also reduce
the price in the auctions where big firms participate (because they are more likely to
be an “additional entrant” and increase competition and because they tend to have
lower costs of performing the contract), but not necessarily the prices in auctions
where only small firms are present. Table 3.2 shows the presence of big and small
firms in the markets defined by average auctions before and after 2011; and the
entry decisions by small and big firms before and after 2011.
Table 3.2: Possibility of entry and entry by small and big firms













Standard deviations in parenthesis.
To estimate the effect of the policy on small and big firms I use the differences-
in-differences approach. I estimate linear models of the following general form:
Outcomejit = α0 + α1Pt + α2Fj + α3Pt × Fj +X ′itβ + Z ′ijtδ + uijt,
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where Outcomejit is entry decision, bidding decision or probability of winning
conditional on entry of firm j in auction i at time t; Pt is a policy dummy equal
to one after 2011 and to zero before 2011; Fj - firm type dummy equal to one for
firms that have stations outside of Sverdlovsk region as well as inside the region,
and to zero for firms that operate only inside the region; Xit is a set of auction
characteristics (same for all firms);Zijt - a set of firm-specific auction characteristics
(such as participation eligibility, number of stations in the defined area of service
etc.)
Table 3.3 presents the results of OLS and differences-in-differences analysis
for all observed bids. It shows that small firms bid less aggressively under the
new information policy while big firms bid more aggressively. Table 3.4 presents
the results of probability of entrance regressions. Since interpreting the coefficients
associated with the interaction terms in non-linear models is somewhat fuzzy I focus
on linear probability model for the differences-in-differences results. As predicted
big firms enter significantly more often after 2011 than before 2011, while there is
no significant effect on small firm entry. It is also worth noting that conditional
on eligibility big firms entered significantly less often than small firms prior to 2011
(firm type coefficient in LPM-DD model in Table 3.4) and enter more often after
2011 (the sum of firm type and after×firm type coefficients in Table 3.4). Table
3.5 presents the results for probability of winning conditional on entry. It shows
no significant differences in probability of winning for small vs big firms before and
after the change of information policy. This means that we would see more big firms
winning the auctions after 2011 - they have the same chance of winning the auction
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if they entered and enter more auctions. These results are in line with my initial
assumption about the effect that the new policy has on monitoring costs13.
Table 3.3: All bids






Intercept 0.1529*** 0.0599*** 0.1622*** 0.0672***
(0.0383) (0.0121) (0.0379) (0.0123)
After 0.0154*** -0.0184** 0.0314*** -0.0306***
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0070) (0.0072)
Large firm 0.0084* -0.0107** 0.0381*** -0.0334***





Open auction 0.0011 0.0039 0.0010 0.0043





N pot. entrants 0.0036* -0.0068*** 0.0027 -0.0063***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Stations share -0.0243 0.0280* -0.0263* 0.0298*
(0.0154) (0.0159) (0.0153) (0.0158)
Contract con-
trols
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 519 519 519 519
R-squared 0.597 0.091 0.608 0.104
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses.
13These results hold if municipalities with partial data and “federal” buyers are left out of the
sample, see Appendix 5.
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Table 3.4: Probability of entry
Probit LPM LPM-DD
Intercept -1.7292*** -0.1411 0.0004
(0.6369) (0.2029) (0.2026)
After 0.3595*** 0.1325*** 0.0020
(0.0923) (0.0302) (0.0381)












N pot. entrants -0.0858** -0.0259* 0.0027
(0.0398) (0.0133) (0.0020)





Observations 1503 1503 1503
R-squared 0.121 0.138
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Probability of winning conditional on entry
Probit LPM LPM-DD
Intercept -1.4758 0.0059 -0.0130
(1.2815) (0.4317) (0.4326)
After 0.0709 0.0025 -0.0351
(0.1697) (0.0600) (0.0775)












N pot. entrants 0.2081*** 0.0734*** 0.0823***
(0.0711) (0.0242) (0.0252)





Observations 502 502 502
R-squared 0.119 0.120
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
3.4 Estimation of entry costs
To tackle the structural effect of the policy change on behavior of both large
and small firms, I assume that all bidders must obtain information about the auction
prior to the auction. A more centralized source of information would then reduce
entry costs for all types of bidders. However, since I study a simple product which is
sold by all auction participants in an open market, I would assume that all potential
bidders know their true costs of fulfilling the project prior to entry, and the entry
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costs consist of searching the auction, fulfilling the eligibility criteria, preparing bid-
ding documentation etc. To estimate the cost distributions of large and small firms,
and their entry costs before and after policy change, I use the Samuelson (1985)
model of selective entry: the bidders would enter as long as their expected profits
are higher than the entry costs, and each equilibrium bidding strategy includes a
threshold value of costs such that bidders with higher costs do no enter the auction.
I would also use the methodology of estimating truncated cost distributions of small
and large firms based on Guerre et al. (2000) and further on Flambard and Perrigne
(2006).
Assume that there are nF small firms and nR large firms who are eligible to
participate in the auction. Small firms draw their costs independently from a dis-
tribution FF (c), and large firms draw their costs independently from a distribution
FR(c). To enter into the auction, the small firm has to incur entry costs κF , and
the large firm has to incur entry costs κR.
If all other bidders bid according to some monotonic strategies φR(b) and φF (b)
the expected profits of bidder type i = F,R are:
Πi(b) = (b− c)(1− Fi(φi(b)))ni−1(1− Fj(φj(b)))nj . (3.1)
The bidder enters the auction if Π∗i (c) ≥ κi, and in equilibrium should chose













, i = F,R (3.2)
As Flambard and Perrigne (2006) note, the distribution of bids we observe in
this case is truncated, and if ĉi is the threshold entry value for the bidder of type i






This means that it is enough to observe the distribution of bids and the entry
probability F̂i(ĉ) to be able to estimate both the distribution of costs and the entry
costs of each type of bidder.
Since the distribution of reserve prices in my data changes over the time (shown
on figure 3.3), I start the estimation by calculating the entry probabilities for both









where ni is the number of entrants in the auction and ẑr(p) is the nonparametrically
estimated distribution of reserve price.
I then estimate the bid distributions for small and large firms before and after
the policy change. Figure 3.4 shows the resulting estimates of these distributions.
Both small and large firms bid lower on average after the policy change, though it
is hard to say whether it is linked to the changes in the reserve prices or in entry
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Figure 3.3: Kernel estimates of reserve price distribution before and after the policy
change
costs.
Figure 3.4: Kernel estimates of relative bid distributions for small and large firms









, i = F,R (3.5)
to calculate cost estimates for each bidder and estimate the truncated cost distri-
butions for both types of bidders before and after the policy change.
The resulting estimates of the truncated cost distributions for small and large
firms are shown on Figure 3.5. One can note that the large firm costs are visibly
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smaller on average after the policy change. However the small firms cost distribution
before the policy change is bimodal with one of the modes lower than the post change
average costs of a small entrant, and the other one larger. This might indicate that
three types of firms rather than two should be used, especially since the market
structure can also be represented by three distinct types of firms (local, regional,
and federal). However the difference in estimated cost distributions of the large
firms might also indicate that a more comprehensive model accounting for forward-
looking behavior of these firms is needed. Though it can be partially explained by
smaller entry costs that allow large firms to enter even when expected profits are
low, it might also be a sign of the large firms entering to prevent future competition
or signal their current state to the small firms as in the model of Chapter 2. These
results might also indicate the identification problems linked to a small sample size
of the auctions before the policy change.
Figure 3.5: Kernel estimates of relative costs distributions for small and large firms
However if we trust the estimated cost distributions above, we can derive the
estimates or entry costs for each type of firms before and after the policy change.
To estimate the entry costs for each type of bidders, I assume that I observe the
threshold bidder of each type before and after the change, and that the expected
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profits at ĉi = max ci are the entry costs. The estimates shown in Table 3.6 suggest
that the entry costs are relatively small (less than 0.01% of the market price of the
contract), but were decreased by the policy change order of magnitude for the large
firms, and increased for the small firms.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have looked at the effects of reducing costs of obtaining infor-
mation about upcoming and past auctions for key auction outcomes. The informa-
tion policy introduced in Jan 2011 in Russian public procurement had ambiguous
effects. The reform had different effect on small and large firms: there is no signif-
icant effect on observed small firms entry, significant positive effect on large firms
entry; large firms bid more aggressively after the introduction of new policy, while
small firms bid less aggressively. Although it did increase participation rates espe-
cially for big firms that have stations in several Russian regions, it did not increase
the overall competitiveness of bidding.
The asymmetry of the reaction of big firms and small firms to the reform is in
line with the “monitoring costs” intuition: firms have to obtain information about
upcoming and past auctions in order to participate and bid optimally. The new
information policy should significantly reduce these costs for the big firms but not
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for small firms.
The existence of monitoring costs should be taken into account when policies
stimulating entry into auctions are implemented. For example, reducing entry costs
may be not sufficient to induce more entry if the costs of acquiring information stay
the same. In order to asses the relevant importance of informational (monitoring
costs) and non-informational (entry costs) barriers to entry we should be able to see
how these costs factor in firms participation rate and bidding decisions.
Estimates of a static selective entry model show that the entry costs did de-
crease substantially for large firms, and increased for the small firms, potentially
decreasing the overall competitiveness of the auctions. However the resulting esti-
mates of cost distributions for both types of firms also change significantly over type,
suggesting that a more comprehensive model capturing the dynamic considerations
of both types of firms is needed to capture the full effects of the policy change.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Choice of subsample
Figure 3.6: Subsample definition
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3.6.2 Summary statistics
Table 3.7: Summary statistics: North subsample
Variable Description Mean St.dev Min Max Count
After dummy: 0 before Jan
1 2011; 1 after
0.7155 0.4518 0 1 348
Federal dummy: 1 for federal
procurers (are not in
“before”-database)
0.2069 0.4057 0 1 348
Auct type dummy: 1 for open
bid auctions; 0 for
sealed bid
0.2213 0.4157 0 0 348
Sprice Reserve price in RUR 360992 329688 10000 2335800 348
Volume Liters of gasoline
procured
14246.27 14801.23 380 123702 348
nNprodtypes number of types of
gasoline and related
products procured
1.6523 0.8367 1 7 348
Market price market price of
bundle procured at
the time of auction
337105 306585 9283 2369575 348
Rel start price relative reserve price
= (reserve
price)/(market price)
1.0735 0.0772 0.3712 1.5401 348
Npot potential number of
entrants, firms that
have stations in the
area of service defined
4.1876 1.0267 2 7 348




1.4454 0.6704 0 3 348
Rel price relative winning bid
= (winning
bid)/(market price)
1.0519 0.0683 0.5498 1.540 324
Rel bid1 relative second bid
where there were 2 or
more bidders
1.0637 0.046 0.9228 1.2059 182
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Table 3.8: Summary statistics: North subsample before Jan 1, 2011
Variable Mean St.dev Min Max Count
Auct type 0.3637 0.4835 0 0 99
Sprice 466191 469157 27000 2335800 99
Volume 22140 22568 1139 123702 99
Nprodtypes 2.1717 0.9902 2 7 99
Market price 433487 434522 24227 2369574.60 99
Rel start price 1.0795 0.1267 0.3712 1.5401 99
Npot 4.2528 0.741 3 7 99
Npart 1.0404 0.7412 0 3 99
Rel price 1.0621 0.1035 0.9112 1.540 75
Rel bid1 1.0151 0.0431 0.9511 1.0759 8
Table 3.9: Summary statistics: North subsample after Jan 1, 2011
Variable Mean St.dev Min Max Count
Federal 0.2892 0.4542 0 1 249
Auct type 0.1647 0.3716 0 0 249
Sprice 319166 242758 10000 1357200 249
Volume 11108 8397 380 44800 249
Nprodtypes 1.4457 0.6645 1 4 249
Market price 298785 227427 9283 1310800 249
Rel start price 1.0711 0.0445 0.9229 1.1776 249
Npot 4.1646 0.9883 2 7 249
Npart 1.6064 0.5659 1 3 249
Rel price 1.0488 0.0532 0.5498 1.1657 249
Rel bid1 1.0659 0.0450 0.9228 1.2059 174
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Table 3.10: Summary statistics by number of participating bidders






0.3333 2.3333 1.0341 21303.88 3.5833 NA
24
(0.4815) (1.3077) (0.1670) (2867.0) (0.7755)
1
0.4167 2.00 1.0965 26623.48 4.0208 1.0840
48
(0.4982) (0.8251) (0.1168) (26112.59) (1.0208) (0.1085)
2
0.3077 2.3462 1.0851 14581.71 3.9615 1.0184
26
(0.4707) (0.9356) (0.0916) (12622.48) (0.9992) (0.0795)




1 0.3491 1.3397 1.0707 13608.83 4.3396 1.0579
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(0.4789) (0.6155) (0.0425) (10392.73) (1.0680) (0.0482)
2 0.0231 1.5462 1.0716 9195.86 4.0462 1.0417
130
(0.1507) (0.7056) (0.0452) (5695.28) (1.0555) (0.0567)
3 0.0 1.300 1.0561 9013.40 5.100 1.0320
10
(0.0) (0.4830) (0.0518) (5726.41) (0.7379) (0.0473)
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3.6.3 Consistency of demand over time and municipalities
Figure 3.7: Volume demanded: North subsample
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Figure 3.8: Volume demanded: North subsample by municipality
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3.6.4 Robustness to potential biases in data
Table 3.11: Without municipalities with partial data






Intercept 0.1224*** 0.0680*** 0.0088 -0.1164
(0.0396) (0.0148) (0.2077) (0.4492)
After 0.0253*** -0.0245*** 0.0021 0.02
(0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0400) (0.0836)
Big firm 0.0300*** -0.0253** -0.0868* -0.2356**
(0.0097) (0.0100) (0.0476) (0.1039)
After×Big firm -0.0293*** 0.0216** 0.2886*** 0.0149
(0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0540) (0.1075)
Open bid -0.0032 0.0075 -0.1729*** 0.2447***
(0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0408) (0.0844)
Rel start price 0.8324*** 0.2004 0.0372
(0.0324) (0.1645) (0.3684)
Potential entrants 0.0041* -0.0067*** -0.0293** 0.0831***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0137) (0.0254)
Stations share -0.002 0.0066 0.7992*** 1.3612***
(0.0180) (0.0185) (0.1319) (0.2185)
Contract controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 456 456 1446 484
R-squared 0.634 0.074 0.140 0.123
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Table 3.12: Without municipalities with partial data and “federal” firms






Intercept 0.1249*** 0.0613*** -0.0226 -0.3913
(0.0442) (0.0164) (0.2128) (0.4759)
After 0.0275*** -0.0297*** -0.0362 0.0019
(0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0401) (0.0877)
Big firm 0.0326*** -0.0264** -0.0880* -0.2413**
(0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0465) (0.1047)
After×Big firm -0.0358*** 0.0313*** 0.3760*** 0.0537
(0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0545) (0.1120)
Open bid -0.0039 0.0088 -0.1528*** 0.2372***
(0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0416) (0.0849)
Rel start price 0.8343*** 0.1544 0.2616
(0.0367) (0.1680) (0.3940)
Potential entrants 0.0048* -0.0067*** -0.013 0.0862***
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0151) (0.0275)
Stations share -0.0061 0.0058 0.8612*** 1.3716***
(0.0197) (0.0202) (0.1393) (0.2293)
Contract controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 1133 378
R-squared 0.644 0.099 0.194 0.151
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